Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

State of Utah v. John B. Tenney : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
J. Kevin Murphy; Charlene Barlow; Lynn Nicholas; Jan Graham; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Tenney, No. 930778 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5683

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

S&KET NO.

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

T£32L^

Case No. 930778-CA

v.
JOHN B. TENNEY,

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL OF CONVICTIONS FOR SELLING
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES (12 COUNTS), AN
UNCLASSIFIED FELONY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN § 61-1-7
(1986); SECURITIES FRAUD (12 COUNTS), AN
UNCLASSIFIED FELONY UNDER UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §
61-1-1 (1986); UNREGISTERED SECURITIES BROKER (ONE
COUNT), AN UNCLASSIFIED FELONY UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. § 61-1-3 (1986); EMPLOYING UNREGISTERED
AGENTS, AN UNCLASSIFIED FELONY UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. § 61-1-3(2) (1986), ENTERED UPON JURY
VERDICTS IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE
TYRONE E. MEDLEY, PRESIDING.
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768)
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212)
LYNN NICHOLAS (6008)
Assistant Attorneys General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
Attorneys for Appellee
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

FILED
SEP 2 01995
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 930778-CA

v.
Priority No. 2

JOHN B. TENNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL OF CONVICTIONS FOR SELLING
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES (12 COUNTS), AN
UNCLASSIFIED FELONY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN § 61-1-7
(1986); SECURITIES FRAUD (12 COUNTS), AN
UNCLASSIFIED FELONY UNDER UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §
61-1-1 (1986); UNREGISTERED SECURITIES BROKER (ONE
COUNT), AN UNCLASSIFIED FELONY UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. § 61-1-3 (1986); EMPLOYING UNREGISTERED
AGENTS, AN UNCLASSIFIED FELONY UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. § 61-1-3(2) (1986), ENTERED UPON JURY
VERDICTS IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE
TYRONE E. MEDLEY, PRESIDING.
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768)
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212)
LYNN NICHOLAS (6008)
Assistant Attorneys General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
Attorneys for Appellee
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW . . 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED TENNEY TO
REPRESENT HIMSELF AT HIS CRIMINAL TRIAL, AND
TENNEY CANNOT EXPECT FAVORABLE TREATMENT ON
APPEAL BECAUSE OF HIS PRO SE STATUS

8

A.

The Standard of Review

9

B.

No Clear Error

10

C.

No Favorable Appellate Treatment

14

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED TENNEY'S
BELATED OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S OPENING
STATEMENT

15

A.

"Victim Impact" Reference: Waiver

17

B.

"Other Investors" Reference: No Abuse of
Discretion

17

POINT II

POINT III THERE WAS NO "PLAIN ERROR" IN STATE'S EXPERT
TESTIMONY ABOUT THE "MATERIALITY" OF TENNEY'S
MISREPRESENTATIONS UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT

24

A.

Waiver of Appellate Argument

25

B.

No Plain Error

26

i

POINT IV

A.

B.

C.
D.
E.

POINT V

THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ANY OF THE
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CHALLENGED BY TENNEY, MOST
OF WHICH HE CHALLENGES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL

29

There Was Neither Error Nor Plain Error in
the Jury Instructions that Defined "Employing
an Unregistered Agent,"

29

There Was No Plain Error in the Jury
Instructions Defining Tenney's Responsibility
for the Actions of his Agents

37

There Was No Plain Error in Any of the Jury
Instructions Defining Securities Fraud

39

There Was No Plain Error in the Instructions
Defining "Unregistered Broker or Agent.". . . .

44

Tenney's Redundant "Alternative Element
Unanimity" Argument Does Not Prove Plain
Error on Appeal

45

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED TENNEY'S
"JUROR MISCONDUCT"-BASED NEW TRIAL MOTION . . . 46

A.

The Standard of Review

47

B.

No Presumption of Prejudice

47

C.

No Abuse of Discretion Occurred

49

"Incidental and Brief Contact."
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED TENNEY TO
PAY $39,000 RESTITUTION TO CELLWEST INVESTOR
ZIEGLOWSKY

51
52

A.

The Standard of Review

53

B.

No Abuse of Discretion in Restitution Order . . 55

D.
POINT VI

CONCLUSION

56

ii

APPENDICES
Appendix

I - Recommended Colloquy for Self-Representation
Requests
Discussion re: Manner of Testimony
Appendix II - "Prosecutor Misconduct" - based Mistrial
Motion and Trial Court's Ruling Denying
Motion
Appendix III - Ruling Excluding Cellwest Investor List
Appendix

Appendix

IV - "Juror Misconduct" - based New Trial Motion
Stipulation to Submit Motion on Affidavits
Ruling Denying Motion
V - Restitution Hearing

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
State v. West, 617 P.2d 1298 (Mont. 1980)

23

Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah 1983)

36

Arellano v. Western Pac. R. Co., 298 P.2d 527 (1956)

47

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)

33

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993) . .

3, 47

denied,

Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App.), cert,
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991)

26

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)

8, 10, 14
denied,

Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.), cert,
502 U.S. 980 (1991)

45

United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985)
Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224 (Utah App. 1990)
Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983)
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah), cert,
U.S.

....

24

. . 48, 51, 52
. . . 26, 29

denied,

, 115 S. Ct. 431 (1994)

14, 34

Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993)

36

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954)

48

Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991)

42

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)

12

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982)

48, 49

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984)

25

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991)

33

State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah App. 1993)
State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993)
iv

9
8,

9,

14

State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983)

36

State v. Bell. 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988)

42

State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989)

55

State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

25

State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848 (Utah App. 1992), cert,
853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)
State v. Drobel. 815 P.2d 724 (Utah App.), cert,

denied,
2

denied,

836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991)

passim

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

passim

State v. Echevarria, 860 P.2d 420 (Wash. App. 1993)

23

State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341 (Utah App. 1991)

51

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992)

34

State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992)

23

State v. Erickson. 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987)

48

State v. Erwin. 120 P.2d 285 (Utah 1941)

23

State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987)

9, 12, 14

State v. Galleaos. 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985)
State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert,

51
denied,

494 U.S. 1090 (1990)

2

State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994)
State v. Hav. 859 P.2d 1 (Utah 1993)

42
2, 18

State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991)

17, 41

State v. Jones. 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991)

34, 35

State v. Kennv. 319 A.2d 232 (N.J. App. 1974),
aff'd,
342 A.2d 189 (N.J. 1975)
State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), vacated
on
other

grounds,

949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991)

State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992)
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993)
v

24
21, 23
27
26, 27, 28

State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994)

17

State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993)

18

State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), cert,
U.S.

denied,

, 115 S. Ct. 910 (1995)

23

State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990)

31

State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App.), cert, denied,

859

P.2d 585 (Utah 1993)

19

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

3, 10, 47

State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985)

48, 52

State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994)

33

State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1993), cert,

denied,

878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994)

54

State v. Russell. 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987)

42

State v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1995)

42, 43

State v. Schoenfeld. 545 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976)
State v. Seale. 853 P.2d 862 (Utah), cert, denied,
, 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993)

43
U.S.
18

State v. Snvder. 747 P.2d 417 (Utah 1987)

3, 54

State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991)

23

State v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988)

2

State v. Swain. 835 P.2d 1009 (Utah App. 1992)

48

State v. Swan. 31 Utah 336, 88 P. 12 (1906)

43

State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)

34

State v. T h o m e . 39 Utah 208, 117 P. 58 (1911)

48

State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)

18, 41, 42, 54

State v. Trov. 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984)

17, 18, 19, 21

State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992)
State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989)
vi

. . . .

3, 54
4, 10, 25, 33, 34

State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)

55

State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64 (Utah 1993)

3, 47

State v. Williams. 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 1982)

20, 23

State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992)

25

Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

34

Tillman v. Cook. 855 P.2d 211 (Utah 1993), cert,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 706 (1994)

denied,
41

U.S. Xpress. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 886 P.2d 1115 (Utah
App. 1994)

17, 21

United States v. Leuben. 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987)

28

United States v. SCOP. 846 F.2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1988)

28

United States v. Stahl. 616 F.2d 30 (2nd Cir. 1980)

23

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. VI

3

U.S. Const, amend. XIV

3

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1986)

1, 3, 26, 43

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1986)

1, 3

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1986)

1, 3

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13 (1986)

1, 3, 30, 44

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14 (1986)

3, 36

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1995) . .

31

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-201 (1995)

39

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995)

39

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-205 (1995)

39

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1986)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1995)

55

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1994)
vii

1

Utah R. App. P. 24

25, 45

Utah R. Crim. P. 17

3, 47, 49, 50

Utah R. Evid. 702

3, 11, 19, 26

Utah R. Evid. 704

3

viii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

: Case No. 930778-CA

v.
JOHN B. TENNEY,

: Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant John B. Tenney appeals his convictions for
selling unregistered securities (12 counts), securities fraud (12
counts), being an unregistered securities broker (one count), and
employing unregistered agents (two counts), all unclassified
felonies under Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-7, 61-1-1, and 61-1-3
(1986).

The convictions were entered upon jury verdicts in the

Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah,
the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding.

Tenney also appeals a

restitution order entered upon one of the securities convictions.
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §782a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994) .
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The question whether Tenney was properly permitted to
represent himself at trial is a threshold issue that also bears
upon the resolution of the other issues on appeal. Accordingly,
the State addresses the issues in the following order:

I.

Whether the trial court properly granted Tenney's

request to represent himself.

Resolution of such a request is a

decision about which of two constitutionally-guaranteed yet
mutually exclusive rights will be honored.

Therefore, a trial

court's decision whether to permit self-representation is
State

deferentially reviewed on appeal for "clear error."
Drobel,

v.

815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 1991).
II.

Whether the trial court properly denied Tenney's

mistrial motion, made after the State had completed its case-inchief, in which Tenney alleged prosecutor misconduct in opening
statement.

A trial court's ruling on a mistrial motion is

reviewed with great deference.

See, e.g., State

1, 6 (Utah 1993); State v. Gardner,
1989), cert, denied,

v.

Hay,

859 P.2d

789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah

494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State v. Speer,

P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); State v. Cummins,

750

839 P.2d 848, 853

(Utah App. 1992) (all stating "abuse of discretion" standard).
III.

Whether there was "plain error" in permitting

State's experts to testify whether Tenney's misstatements and
omissions amounted to "material" misrepresentations under Utah's
securities laws.

"Plain error," argued on appeal when no trial-

level objection preserved the legal issue in question, is a de
novo determination.

"Plain error" requires the appellant to

prove "error," "obviousness," and "prejudice," in order to
overcome the presumption that the underlying legal issue was
waived by the failure to raise it at trial.
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
2

State

v.

Dunn,

850

IV.
instructions.
V.

Whether there was "plain error" in the jury"Plain error" is explained under issue III, above.
Whether the trial court properly denied Tenney's

new trial motion, based upon an out-of-court conversation about
the case, during a trial recess, between a juror and one of
Tenney's friends. Normally, a trial court's ruling on a new
trial motion is deferentially reviewed on appeal.

State v.

Pena,

869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70
(Utah 1993).

But see Crookston

v. Fire

Ins.

Exchange,

860 P.2d

937, 938 (Utah 1993) (if new trial ruling turns on a legal
premise, it will be reviewed nondeferentially).
VI.

Whether the trial court properly ordered Tenney to

pay $39,000 restitution to one of the securities fraud victims.
Restitution orders are also reviewed deferentially for "abuse of
discretion."

State

State v. Twitchell,

v. Snyder,

747 P.2d 417, 422 (Utah 1987);

832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Tenney has reproduced the following provisions in
addendum A to his Brief of Appellant:

U.S. CONST, amends. VI, XIV;

Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1, 61-1-3, 61-1-7, 61-1-13, 61-1-14, 76-3201 (1986); Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (j); Utah R. Evid. 702, 704. They
will be so referenced, as appropriate, in this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tenney was charged with, and found guilty of, twentyseven counts of violating Utah's securities laws:
acquitted on two additional counts (R. 192-97).
3

He was

Tenney was

sentenced to prison terms of zero to three years for each of
those unclassified felonies, in a combination of concurrent and
consecutive sentencing that totalled fifteen years.

The prison

terms were suspended subject to probation conditions (see R. 79599, copied in Br. of Appellant addendum C).
Following a post-trial hearing, Tenney was ordered to
pay a total of $92,950 in restitution to ten of the fraud victims
(R. 2503-04, copied in Br. of Appellant addendum E).

Besides

appealing the underlying convictions, Tenney also appeals $39,000
of the restitution order, involving one of those victims.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tenney does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the guilty verdicts.

The State thus recites

the facts in abbreviated fashion, and in verdict-favoring light,
State

v.

Verde,

770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989),

From 1986 through 1988, Tenney sold stock in a
corporation called "Cellwest" (also called "ReCom") to a number
of Utah investors; thirteen of those sales formed the basis for
the charges in this case.

Tenney, however, was not a registered

securities broker or sales agent (R. 1399-1404; State's Exh. 94).
In several instances, the stock sales were mediated for Tenney by
Steven Rick Jensen or Steven Bowers, who also were not registered
sales agents (R. 1059-60, 1064, 1119-20, 1311, 1340, 1358-60,
1399-1404 (State's 94), 1638-40),

Additionally, the Cellwest

(/ReCom) stock was not registered with the Utah Division of
Securities, as required by law (R. 1460-67; State's Exh. 93).
4

The investors were persuaded to purchase Cellwest stock
by a common sales pitch, with occasional variations, as follows:
Cellwest was in the business of renting cellular telephones to
rental car customers (R. 1119, 1139, 1158, 1226, 1236, 1255,
1266, 1295, 1312).

Cellwest's stock would be "going public" or

"coming out" on the open market soon (R. 1551-52), and its value
would increase "substantially," to twice or more its sale price
of $2.00 to $2.50 per share (R. 1120, 1140, 1159, 1202-03, 123637, 1361, 2110-11).

This sales pitch, sometimes accompanied by a

written Cellwest business plan and brochure (R. 1141, 1161-62
(State's Exhs. 36-37)), failed to disclose certain information
required by law (R. 1163-64, 1204-05, 1228-30, 1238, 1475-78).
However, Tenney spiced the deal by promising to buy back the
Cellwest stock, six months later at the purchaser's option, at
$5.00 per share (R. 1146, 1167, 1203, 1224, 1240, 1255, 1295,
1312-13, 1339, 1362).
Tenney's glittering promises about Cellwest were never
honored (R. 1148, 1173, 1207, 1230, 1240, 1263, 1343, 1373-74).
There was no evidence that Cellwest ever entered into any
cellular telephone rental contracts with car rental agencies.
Nor was Cellwest stock ever listed on any public stock exchange
(R. 1208, 1173-74).

Further, when asked to do so by several

investors, Tenney (sometimes through spokesmen) refused to honor
the buy-back agreement (R. 1173, 1207, 1240-41, 1300).

In some

such instances, Tenney attempted to placate investors by
referring to vaguely-described delays in listing Cellwest on
5

stock exchanges, or by giving them additional Cellwest stock at
no charge (R. 1170-73, 1209-11).x
Tenney's activities were eventually reported to the
Utah Attorney General's Office, which successfully prosecuted
him.

He now appeals, raising numerous assignments of error.

The

facts pertinent to those alleged errors will be set forth under
the appropriate argument points of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court properly granted Tenney's request

to represent himself.

Tenney presented himself as well-educated,

experienced in self-representation, and well-versed in securities
law.

He acknowledged his duty to master procedural rules, and

further acknowledged the trial court's recommendation that he not
proceed pro se. Under these circumstances, the trial court's
ruling that Tenney knowingly and voluntarily chose selfrepresentation should be affirmed.
II.

Tenney's claim that the prosecutor committed

misconduct in her opening statement also fails.

Part of that

claim is waived because Tenney never raised it in the trial
court.

The other part—whether misconduct was committed by

reference to Cellwest investors not named in Tenney's criminal
charges--was properly rejected by the trial court.

Tenney

demonstrates no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling that
the reference was proper because it was made in reasonable
investor Rocky Ulibarri was refunded his $1000.00 investment
when his wife intervened on his behalf (R. 1322-23). There is a
lesson in this, although not relevant to this appeal.
6

anticipation that supporting evidence would be admitted at trial.
Nor does he demonstrate error in the court's ruling that because
the State's other evidence was strong, reference to the other
investors was not prejudicial.
III.

Tenney's unpreserved challenged to State's expert

witness testimony fails because he does not prove "plain error."
He focuses only on the "error" component, without meaningfully
briefing whether such alleged error was "obvious" or prejudicial.
Nor could Tenney prove plain error if he briefed it:

admission

of the belatedly-challenged testimony was discretionary with the
trial court, no case law at the time of trial squarely prohibited
the testimony, and the State's other evidence was powerful.
IV.

This Court should also reject Tenney's largely

unpreserved challenges to various jury instructions.

The only

preserved challenge fails because Tenney improperly attempts to
interject the common law doctrine of "agency" into instructions
that defined securities "agent;" that term is statutorily
defined, and therefore no common law-based modification is
permissible.

Tenney's six other unpreserved challenges fail

because he uniformly does not prove the "prejudice" component of
plain error, as settled precedent requires him to do.
V.

Nor should this Court find abuse of discretion in

the trial court's denial of Tenney's new trial motion, raised
when Tenney discovered that during a trial recess, a trial juror
had a conversation with one of Tenney's acquaintances.

While the

conversation was improper, it was very brief, and Tenney's
7

acquaintance spoke favorably of Tenney.

Therefore, the

conversation caused no prejudice against Tenney, who only
fancifully speculates to the contrary.
VI.

Finally, this Court should deny Tenney's partial

challenge to the restitution order involving one of the defrauded
Cellwest investors.

Tenney's attempt to convert this issue into

one of constitutional "due process" fails because he expressly
permitted the restitution question to be tried by proffer.

His

claim that restitution should have been decided in a civil action
also fails, because the legislature, in a statute that Tenney
does not claim is unconstitutional, requires criminal courts to
make restitution orders. And Tenney does not show clear error in
the restitution calculation, supported by proffer plus
documentary evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED TENNEY TO
REPRESENT HIMSELF AT HIS CRIMINAL TRIAL, AND
TENNEY CANNOT EXPECT FAVORABLE TREATMENT ON
APPEAL BECAUSE OF HIS PRO SE STATUS
Having expressly invoked his constitutional right to
represent himself, see Faretta
(1975), State v. Bakalov,
(Bakalov

II),

v. California,

422 U.S. 806

862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993) (per curiam)

Tenney complains on appeal that the trial court

erroneously allowed him to do so (Br. of Appellant at 53-61).2
Self-representation must be allowed once a criminal defendant
2

Tenney had backup, advisory counsel from the Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association, which represents him now on appeal.
8

"voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" so chooses.
II,

862 P.2d at 1355.

Bakalov

Tenney's argument, which this Court should

reject, is that he did not voluntarily and knowingly choose selfrepresentation.
A.

The Standard of Review.
In State v. Drobel,

815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App. 1991),

this Court held that a trial court's resolution of a selfrepresentation request, encompassing the "knowing and voluntary"
inquiry, will be reversed on appeal only if it is clearly
erroneous.3

The caveat for such deferential review is that the

trial court must apply the correct legal standard in reaching its
decision.

Id.

See

also

State

(Utah App. 1993) {Bakalov

I).

v.

Bakalov,

849 P.2d 629, 634

The typical legal error in such

cases occurs when the trial court denies a self-representation
request based upon the defendant's "best interest."
II,

862 P.2d at 1355 n.l.

See

Bakalov

No such error occurred in this case.

Hence, the only issue is whether Tenney knowingly and voluntarily
opted for self-representation.
Inquiry into this issue, which encompasses a waiver of
the right to professional counsel, necessarily entails review of
a unique set of circumstances.

In State v. Frampton,

737 P.2d

183, 187-88 & n.12 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court approved a
sixteen-point, federally-developed colloquy to guide this
3

In Drobel, 815 P.2d at 731-32 n.ll, this Court observed that
the term "intelligent" is surplusage, representing whether a
defendant
"knowingly,"
i.e.,
with
full
information
and
understanding, invoked self-representation. Therefore, the State's
analysis in main text deletes the term "intelligent."
9

inquiry.

In Drobel,

815 P.2d at 732, this Court followed suit

(the Frampton-recommended colloquy is copied in appendix I of
this brief).

Because the "knowing and voluntary" standard

ultimately asks whether the defendant elected self-representation
"with eyes open," Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, generous deference,
implicit in the "clear error" standard, is appropriately due to a
trial court's resolution of a self-representation request.
State

v. Pena,
B«

Cf.

869 P.2d 932, 937-39 (Utah 1994).4

No Clear Error.
Dangers

of

Self-Representation

Tenney argues that the trial court did not "advise
[him] of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation."
Therefore, he continues, the court clearly erred in granting his
self-representation request (Br. of Appellant at 54, 61). That
argument cannot prevail.
In fact, the trial court's colloquy with Tenney (R.
2234-44, copied in Br. of Appellant addendum J), included proper
warnings.

The court observed that Tenney was not "informed and

knowledgeable regarding the rules of evidence as it relates to
criminal law issues, as well as the rules of criminal procedure,"
and inquired how Tenney would be able to "master those rules" as
a pro se defendant (R. 2236) . The court warned Tenney that if
4

Tenney oddly states that his self-representation should be
reviewed for "plain error" (Br. of Appellant at 59-60) . "Plain
error" allows appellate review of a legal argument waived by
default in the trial court. State
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121
(Utah 1989). Plain error analysis is not needed in this case,
because the question whether Tenney should have been allowed to
represent himself was not waived; the trial court ruled on it.
10

found guilty, he could be sentenced to over a hundred years'
imprisonment plus substantial fines (R. 2239-41).

Given "the

serious nature of the charges," the court advised Tenney against
self-representation (R. 2244) .
The foregoing colloquy conveyed, "in essence if not
verbatim," DroJbel, 815 P. 2d at 732, at least six of the
recommended points about self-representation risks, covering
potential penalties for the charged offenses, the necessity that
rules of evidence and procedure be followed, and a warning that
self-representation is unwise (see Frampton

inquiries (d),

(g)/ (h), (i), (j), (1) and (m), appendix I of this brief).

(e),
The

record shows that Tenney had no difficulty understanding those
warnings.

He nevertheless asserted, "with all due respect," his

desire to represent himself (R. 2244) .
Tenney also argues that the trial court warned him too
late that he would be required to present his own testimony in
question-and-answer form (Br. of Appellant at 59). The court so
warned Tenney at the end of trial day four, whereupon Tenney
himself acknowledged the distinction between question-and-answer
testimony and the "narrative" approach he hoped to utilize (R.
1723-28, copied in appendix I).

Tenney acknowledged the court's

discretion, Utah R. Evid. 611, to decide how his testimony would
be presented (R. 1725).

That exchange makes it clear that Tenney

was well aware, early in the trial, that he might not be allowed
to testify in narrative form.

Therefore, even if it would have

been preferable to so warn Tenney before granting his self11

representation request, see Frampton,

737 P.2d 187-88 n.12

(admonishment (k)), that warning was unnecessary.5
And because the admonishments in Frampton

are

recommended, but not mandatory, no single point therein is a
qua non for deciding a self-representation request.
Schneckloth

v. Bustamonte,

sine

Cf.

412 U.S. 218, 224-27 (1973) (no

"talismanic" factor exists for determining voluntariness of a
confession or search consent).

In this case, the trial court's

warning that Tenney would need to master evidentiary rules (R.
2236) encompassed an expectation that Tenney would learn those
rules sufficiently to properly present his own trial testimony.
In sum, Tenney was adequately warned of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation.
Other Supporting

Circumstances

By other inquiries, the trial court further ascertained
the Tenney knowingly and voluntarily chose self-representation.
The trial court asked Tenney about his education, his experience
as a pro se litigant, and his understanding about the "beyond
reasonable doubt" standard for criminal guilt {Frampton

inquiries

(a), (b)). Tenney replied that he held a master's degree in
business administration, and that he had represented himself in
civil lawsuits related to other securities transactions (R. 2234,

5

Tenney's exchange with the trial court revealed a tactical
reason for representing himself: "I would prefer the narrative
approach simply because I want to impress the Jury with the fact
that I am pro se" (R. 1724) . In fact, he argued this point to the
jury (R. 2180-83). This also supports the conclusion that Tenney
knowingly and voluntarily invoked his self-representation right.
12

2235).

While admitting that he was "certainly not an expert in

the law," Tenney asserted that he knew the facts of the.case
better than the public defender whose services were offered to
him, and that he was "a very quick study" regarding procedure (R.
2236-37).
Tenney further asserted, "I do understand securities
laws because I have studied them extensively" (R. 2236) . Under
that law, Tenney expressed his intention to pursue the arguable
defense that he lacked the necessary intent, or "security law
scienter" to defraud his Cellwest investors (R. 2237); in fact,
his defense centered on the asserted non-willfulness of his
actions (R. 2183-84 ("'willfully' is the word on which I will win
or lose this case, period")).

See DroJbel, 815 P.2d at 735

(defendant's recognition of legitimate defenses supported finding
that he knowingly exercised self-representation right).

Tenney

concluded, "I believe I am not over-matched in this case because
I come into court with a great deal of facts and the law on my
side" (R. 2237).

Under all these circumstances, the trial court

properly, albeit tacitly, found that Tenney knowingly and
voluntarily chose self-representation.

See id.

at 734 & n.20

("knowing and voluntary" ruling inferred within grant of selfrepresentation request).
Based upon its colloquy with Tenney, the trial court
was probably accurate in commenting that it had "no choice" but
to grant Tenney's self-representation request (R. 2244); the

13

request was knowingly and voluntarily made.

Bakalov

II,

862 P.2d

at 1355. This Court should affirm the grant of that request.
C.

No Favorable Appellate Treatment.
There is an additional consequence--more accurately,

lack of consequence--that flows from the affirmance of Tenney's
self-representation request.

This Court should reject Tenney's

implicit suggestion that because he proceeded pro se at trial,
settled principles of waiver and default should be relaxed for
his benefit on appeal.

See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 24 n.2

(prosecutor and trial court should have limited State's evidence
on behalf of "Tenney, a pro se defendant"); id.

at 44 (arguing

plain error "in the context of this pro se case").

For two

reasons, that suggestion is incorrect.
First, because Tenney cannot argue his own
ineffectiveness as counsel, Faretta,
Frampton,

422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46,

737 P.2d at 189, he ought not be allowed more leniency

to argue "plain error."

The doctrines of counsel ineffectiveness

and plain error can allow appellate relief from legal errors that
were waived by default at trial; however, both doctrines require
the appellant to carry a heavy burden of proof.
Barnes,

Parsons

v.

871 P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1994); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d

1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).

This Court ought not lighten Tenney's

appellate burden of proving plain error:

to do so would permit

him an improper end run around the bar against arguing "pro se
ineffectiveness.ff

14

Second, in this case Tenney affirmatively claimed that
he had particular expertise in securities law, that he was a
"quick study" who would easily learn trial procedure, and that he
had thorough factual knowledge of the transactions that were the
subject of his prosecution.
unwise.

Cf. Drobel,

In hindsight, those claims may seem

815 P.2d at 734-35. However, the self-

representation right is not based upon fair trial concerns;
rather, it embodies the criminal defendant's "personal right to
be a fool."

Id.

at 736 (quoting State

809, 644 P.2d 763, 764 (1982)).

v. Hoff,

31 Wash. App.

This Court ought not relieve

Tenney of the natural consequences of voluntary choice.
Among those consequences is the waiver, on appeal, of
legal arguments not raised in the trial court.

That bar should

be as high for Tenney as it is for a professionally-represented
defendant.

In the points that follow, the State asserts that bar

where applicable, and addresses his "plain error" arguments no
differently than if Tenney had been professionally represented at
trial.

We ask this Court to do the same.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED TENNEY'S
BELATED OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S OPENING
STATEMENT
In his opening point on appeal, Tenney argues that the

prosecutor committed "misconduct" by referring, in opening
statement, to Cellwest investors other than those who were the
subject of the prosecution, and to the total money invested by
all the investors.

The reference was as follows:
15

Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. This
is a case about innocent, hard-working people who
got taken in a securities scam. They got taken by
a smooth-talking salesman who sold them stock that
wasn't worth the paper it was written on. The
defendant, John Tenney, deliberately defrauded
dozens of decent people, 333 people, mostly
citizens of Utah, bought Cellwest stock for
somewhere between 4 million and $11 million. So
the State has charged him with 29 counts of
violating the Utah Blue Sky Law. That is the Utah
Uniform Securities Act, and we will talk about the
Blue Sky Law a little bit later. While Tenney was
collecting all of that money, investors were
losing their shirts.
(R. 998). Tenney also complains that the prosecutor's opening
statement description of the loss suffered by one Cellwest
investor, James Zieglowsky, was improper "victim impact evidence"
(Br. of Appellant at 19-20).
Tenney did not object to the above statements when they
were made.

However, soon thereafter, during Tenney's opening

statement, the trial court admonished the jury that statements
and arguments of counsel are not evidence:
Let me give you this admonition. Whether it be
the State's opening statement, Mr. Tenney's
opening statement, the closing statements that you
are going to hear at the end of the case, as well
as the closing rebuttal argument, it is important
for you to understand that those statements in and
of themselves are not evidence in this particular
case. Those statements are solely designed to
assist you in understanding and interpreting what
you believe the evidence to be.
(R. 1097).

That admonition was repeated during Tenney's closing

argument (R. 2182), and in the jury instructions (R. 689).
Tenney did not object to the prosecutor's opening
statement until three trial days after it was made, when he moved
for a mistrial after the State had completed its case-in-chief
16

(R. 579-80, 1671-81 (copied in appendix II of this brief)).

As

ground for his motion, Tenney asserted the trial court's
exclusion, well after opening statements, of the State's list of
all Cellwest investors (R. 579-80, 1672-73).
analyzing Tenney's mistrial motion under State

The trial court,
v.

Troy,

688 P.2d

483 (Utah 1984) properly denied the motion (R. 1681).
A.

"Victim Impact" Reference: Waiver.
Tenney's appellate challenge to the prosecutor's

"victim impact" reference--i.e., the description of James
Zieglowsky's financial loss--fails because Tenney never
challenged that reference in the trial court.

His mistrial

motion assailed only the statements about the number of Cellwest
investors (see appendix II).

Therefore, the trial court never

had an opportunity to rule on the "victim impact" reference.
State v. Johnson,

821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991).

See

On appeal,

Tenney briefs no exception to the waiver bar against this
challenge; therefore, this Court should reject it.
Lopez,
State

886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); U.S. Xpress,

See State
Inc.

v.

Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Utah App. 1994) ("It is

well settled that, absent extraordinary circumstances or plain
error, issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal").
B.

"Other Investors" Reference: No Abuse of Discretion..
However, the trial court did reach the merits of

Tenney's belated challenge to the prosecutor's statement about
Cellwest investors not involved in this criminal case.

It

therefore appears that this Court should address the merits on
17

v.

appeal.

See State

v. Seale,

853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah) (when legal

issues raised first raised in a new trial motion are addressed on
their merits by trial court, waiver is removed), cert,
U.S.

, 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993); State v. Lucero,

denied,

866 P.2d 1,

2 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (same).6
Review on the merits begins with identification of the
standard of appellate review.

As set forth in this brief's

statement of issues, the law is settled that a trial court's
ruling on a "prosecutor misconduct"-based mistrial motion is
reviewed under the deferential "abuse of discretion" standard.
See, e.g., State

v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993).

There is no

question that the trial court applied the governing legal
standard, set forth in Troy,
discretionary decision:

688 P.2d at 485-86, to its

on appeal, Tenney himself invokes Troy

(Br. of Appellant at 21, 23, 25).
Troy sets forth a two-step, "misconduct plus prejudice"
analysis of alleged prosecutor misconduct:

(1) whether the

prosecutor called jurors' attention to matters that could not
justifiably be considered in reaching a verdict; (2) if so,
whether the jurors, under "the circumstances of the case as a
whole," were probably influenced by the prosecutor's remarks.
688 P.2d at 486 (quoting State v. Valdez,
422, 426 (1973)).

30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d

The second step includes inquiry into the

6

Sut see State
v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, -561 (Utah 1987)
( [I]t is the rule that if improper statements are made by counsel
during a trial, it is the duty of opposing counsel to register a
contemporaneous
objection thereto . . . " (emphasis added)).
l!
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strength of the State's case:

the stronger the evidence, the

less likely it is that the jurors were influenced by the
prosecutor's remarks.

Id.

Applying Troy,

the trial court

properly denied Tenney's mistrial motion.
No

Mi8conduct

First, the court legitimately determined that the
prosecutor's remarks about the number of Cellwest investors and
the total money invested did not involve matters that could not
be considered by the jury (R. 1679-80).

"Other acts" evidence is

relevant to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
Utah R. Evid. 404(b); State v. O'Neil,
(Utah App.), cert, denied,

848 P.2d 694, 699-701

859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).

In this

case, Tenney raised a "no intent" defense (R. 2183-85, 2237),
making evidence of his other Cellwest securities transactions
relevant, and thus presumptively admissible.7
Unfortunately, the trial court excluded State's
exhibits 88 and 89, which listed over 300 Cellwest investors, and
were offered to prove Tenney's scheme and intent to defraud (R.
1434-40, copied in appendix III).

The court did not deny the

State's argument that the investor list was relevant for that
purpose.

However, the court excluded the list upon determining,

under Utah R. Evid. 403, that its relevance was substantially
7

Tenney also placed his other acts into issue when, during his
opening statement, he described an allegedly similar, successful
business venture: "That company was extremely successful. We had
3,700 shareholders. The stock went from 10 cents a share to $25 a
share. Went up 250 times in 14 months" (R. 1006).
19

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice:

"[T]his Court is

of the opinion that while the evidence may, in fact, be relevant,
Ms. Barlow, that the prejudicial effect of this evidence far
outweighs its probative value" (R. 1439).8
Under these circumstances, the prosecutor did not
commit misconduct in her opening statement that there were over
three hundred Cellwest investors.

Having reason to believe that

the investor list would be admitted because it was relevant, the
prosecutor appropriately stated the facts that the list would
prove.

State v. Williams,

656 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1982).

She

had neither the ability nor the duty of clairvoyance to predict
the trial court's subsequent discretionary exclusion of that
evidence under rule 403.

The trial court recognized this:

Despite the fact that at this stage, anyway, the
Court did not allow into evidence State's proposed
Exhibits 88 and 89, which I believe are alleged to
be Stockholders Lists, the statements made by the
Prosecutor in this particular case, in this
Court's opinion, was [sic] made on reasonable
reliance that the evidence regarding those lists
would come into evidence.
And hindsight is always 20/20, obviously.
And despite the fact that that evidence was not
received, the Court is not of the opinion that the
Prosecutor was attempting to call to the attention

8

Tenney never denied that the list, which had been maintained
by his own office staff, reasonably reflected the number of
Cellwest investors; he argued instead that it was not known to be
perfectly accurate because "we have had some problems with our
stockholder's list," and that there were "at least three or four
versions of the list" (R. 1435, 1436-37).
20

of the Jury matters that were clearly outside of
the evidence.
(R. 1679-80).9
The trial court also distinguished Troy,

in which the

prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly making irrelevant,
prejudicial statements to the jury (R. 1680).

In this case, the

challenged prosecutorial statement occurred one time, and dealt
with relevant evidence.

The court therefore did not abuse its

discretion in finding no prosecutor misconduct.10
Attempting to prove an abuse of discretion, Tenney
briefs at length the question whether "bad faith" is an element
of prosecutor misconduct (Br. of Appellant at 24-26) . Because
Tenney's mistrial motion never mentioned this question, and
because he raises no exception to the rule of waiver, this Court
ought not reach it.

U.S. Xpress,,

886 P.2d at 1119. And as

follows, the question need not be reached because Tenney fails to
show prejudice caused by the challenged statement.
Lafferty,
grounds,

See State

749 P.2d 1239, 1255 n.13 (Utah 1988), vacated

on

v.
other

949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).

9

Thus Tenney incorrectly asserts that "the State apparently
knew at the time it made its opening statement that the list was
not admissible" (Br. of Appellant at 20 n.l). The trial court
found to the contrary.
ioIn rpr0yt 688 P.2d at 485-86, the prosecutor insinuated that
the defendant operated under an aliase, when in fact he had
obtained a legal name change.
The prosecutor also improperly
alluded to the defendant's placement in a witness protection
program, as well as to an apparent past criminal accusation against
him. In closing argument, the prosecutor analogized the defendant
to John Hinckley (attempted presidential assassin), and invited
jurors to apply their own experiences in deciding the case.
21

Wo

Prejudice

The trial court also properly applied the Troy
"prejudice" inquiry, finding no reasonable likelihood that the
challenged prosecutor statement would sway the jury.

Reviewing

all the circumstances, the court found the State's admitted
evidence to be strong, and observed that the jury had been
admonished to not treat counsel statements as evidence:
Troy basically says that when the evidence is thin
and it's more likely that the jury is going to be
swayed by improper remarks, then the threshold of
prejudice is a little easier met.
On the other hand, where the evidence is
sufficiently compelling--and this Court is of the
opinion that the evidence is sufficiently
compelling. This Court is not convinced that the
statements will have any prejudicial effect,
considering the other compelling evidence that has
been received consistent with the elements of the
counts charged in the information.
Also taking into consideration that the Court
did give an admonition to the Jury instructing
them, the fact that the opening statements made by
the parties were, in fact, not evidence and should
not be construed as evidence by the Jury.
(R. 1681).
On appeal, Tenney does not squarely challenge the
foregoing ruling.

Instead, he asserts in conclusory fashion that

the allegedly improper opening statement "set the tone for the
entire trial" (Br. of Appellant at 28-29).

He overlooks the

testimony of thirteen investors who bought Cellwest stock in
reliance upon Tenney's misrepresentations of information that was
significant to the purchase decisions (e.g., R. 1177, 1231, 1242,
1268); the State's experts similarly opined that Tenney made
22

significant mispresentations in his Cellwest sales pitch (R.
1468-78, 1596-1603.
The trial court found that evidence compelling, and
Tenney does not demonstrate error in that finding.
v. Emmett,

Compare

State

839 P.2d 781, 785-86 (Utah 1992) (prosecutor

improperly used the defendant's forgery conviction for purpose
beyond impeaching his testimony; other evidence of guilt, in
prosecution alleging sodomy upon defendant's child, was "not
compelling").

Nor does Tenney question the presumption that the

jurors obeyed their admonition to decide the case solely upon the
evidence.
denied,
Span,

State v. Menzies,
U.S.

889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994), cert.

, 115 S. Ct. 910 (1995).

Accord

State

v.

819 P.2d 329, 334-35 (Utah 1991) (prejudice insufficient to

require reversal, even though misconduct involved knowing
violation of order to not pursue certain line of questioning);
State

v. Erwin,

120 P.2d 285, 313 (Utah 1941) (improper opening

statement cured by repeated admonition that counsel statements
are not evidence) .xl
lx

See also Lafferty,
749 P.2d at 1254-55 (inaccurate comment
about manner of murder did not warrant reversal because the other
evidence of guilt was "overwhelming"); State v. Williams,
656 P.2d
450 (Utah 1982) (improper argument did not warrant reversal because
of defendant's testimony admitting that he committed the robbery in
question).
The non-Utah, non-controlling authority cited by Tenney is
also distinguishable. E.g.,
State
v. Echevarria,
860 P.2d 420
(Wash. App. 1993) (repeated references to "war on drugs," and
"battlefield of our own streets" improperly "set the tone for the
entire trial"); United States
v. Stahl,
616 F.2d 30, 32-33 (2nd
Cir. 1980) (prosecutor made "persistent appeal to class prejudice"
based upon the defendant's wealth). And State v. West, 617 P.2d
1298 (Mont. 1980), appears flawed (prosecutor referred to expected
hearsay evidence under "unavailable witness" rule, after the
23

To borrow his own adjective (Br. of Appellant at 23),
Tenney's appellate effort to prove error in the trial court's
ruling is "feeble."
prove it.

He alleges prejudicial error, but does not

Therefore, this Court should affirm the denial of

Tenney's "prosecutor misconduct"-based mistrial motion.
POINT THREE
THERE WAS NO "PLAIN ERROR" IN STATE'S EXPERT
TESTIMONY ABOUT THE "MATERIALITY" OF TENNEY'S
MISREPRESENTATIONS UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT
Tenney next argues that two State's expert witnesses
were improperly allowed to give their opinions whether Tenney's
Cellwest sales pitch violated the Utah Uniform Securities Act.
Admitting that he did not object to the testimony at trial,
Tenney concedes that his appellate challenge must be briefed as
"plain error" under State

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) (Br.

of Appellant at 3, 5, 35). Plain error has three components:
(1) error; (2) obviousness; (3) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable verdict absent the error.
appellant must prove all three components.
1208-09.

The

Dunn, 850 P.2d at

Tenney has not carried his burden of proof.

defendant's in limine motion to exclude same had been denied;
appellate court ruled, after-the-fact, that prosecutor should not
have referred to that evidence) . In United States
v. Johnson, 767
F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985), the court disapproved an opening
statement that characterized the defendant as "a thief," but found
no "plain error," given that objection was not made until seven
days later. Finally, in State v. Kenny, 319 A.2d 232 (N.J. App.
1974), the appellate court condemned, in dictum, prosecutor opening
statement and closing argument that "went beyond'the evidence and
the indictment," id. at 241; the conviction was reversed on another
ground, id. at 240 (the defendant had been granted immunity in
exchange for his testimony in a related federal case).
24

A.

Waiver of Appellate Argument.
Most fundamentally, Tenney fails to brief plain error.

He focuses on the alleged impropriety of the State's expert
testimony--i.e., the "error" component of Dunn (Br. of Appellant
at 3 0-35), and mentions obviousness and prejudice only as
afterthoughts, in two brief sentences (Br. of Appellant at 35).
His failure to adequately brief prejudice is especially
surprising, because even errors preserved by timely objection do
not warrant appellate reversal unless they cause prejudice.
State

v. Verde,

770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989) .12

In short, Tenney fails to support this point of his
appeal with the "argument" required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9).
Utah's appellate courts do not entertain such bare allegations of
prejudicial error.

State

v. Bishop,

753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah

1988) (appellate court is "not simply a dumping ground in which
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research"
(quotation and citation omitted)); State

v. Amicone,

689 P.2d

1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support
this argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to
rule on it"); State

v. Yates,

834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992)

("This court has routinely declined to consider arguments which
are not adequately briefed on appeal").

12

Upon this settled

Tenney's one-sentence "prejudice" claim asserts that the
expert testimony "was prejudicial in that the expert witness
instructed the jury that certain elements were established" (Br. of
Appellant at 35) .
That sentence simply substitutes the term
"prejudicial" for "error."
25

principle alone, this Court should reject Tenney's "plain error"
challenge to the State's expert testimony.
B.

No Plain Error.
Tenney could not prove plain error even if he properly

attempted to do so.

He complains that State's experts Krendl and

Nielsen should not have been allowed to opine that Tenney's
misrepresentations about Cellwest were "material" under the Utah
Uniform Securities Act--specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2)
(1986) (Br. of Appellant addendum A ) .

He argues that although

the experts could have testified that the misrepresentations were
"important or significant to an investor," they should not have
been allowed to use the statutory term "material" to describe
them (Br. of Appellant at 30, 34-35).
No

Error

This assertion of error fails because the admissibility
of expert testimony is a matter of "wide" trial court discretion.
State v. Larsen,

865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (^Larsen IJ").

Such discretion is allowed because there is no "bright line"
between admissible expert testimony that "embraces an ultimate
issue," Utah R. Evid. 704, and inadmissible testimony that
"tell[s] the jury what result to reach."
P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
1991).

Accord

Owen v.

Kerr-McGee

Corp.,

Davidson

v. Prince,
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826 P.2d 651 (Utah.
698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th

Cir. 1983) ("[t]he task of separating impermissible questions
which call for overbroad or legal responses from permissible
questions is not a facile one").
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In this case, the trial court

could have reasonably ruled that the experts' use of the term
"material" did not tell the jury what verdict to reach; under the
"abuse of discretion" standard, such ruling would not clearly be
held erroneous on appeal.
No

Obviousness

Nor could Tenney prove obviousness. Absent bright-line
standards, improper expert testimony will rarely, if ever, be
"obviously" so.

Davidson

v. Prince,

relied upon by Tenney,

stating that an expert cannot opine that a personal injury
defendant was negligent, does not set "obvious" limits on expert
testimony in a securities case, based upon a distinctive body of
law.

This Court's Larsen

I opinion, State

v. Larsen,

828 P.2d

487, 493 (Utah App. 1992), held that "use of the term 'material'
may be admitted as permissible fact-oriented [expert] testimony,"
and thus permitted the testimony in this case.
II,

Finally,

Larsen

which discourages use of the term "material" by experts in a

securities case, 865 P.2d at 1361 & n.10, was not decided until
December 1993--six months after Tenney's trial ended.13
Therefore, even if experts might have erroneously testified about

13

Tenney's single-sentence "obviousness" assertion states:
"This error was obvious under Larsen J, Larsen II, and Davidson"
(Br. of Appellant at 35).
In Larsen II, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the State's
expert "certainly should have avoided employing the specific term
'material.'" But the court then held that the expert's use of the
term did "not mandate the conclusion that he was improperly
instructing the jury on the law," and that the defendant's
complaint about the use of the word "material" was "unduly
formalistic." 865 P.2d at 1362. Thus the court did not squarely
answer the question whether the experts could use the term
"material," as held by this Court in Larsen
I.
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"materiality" in this case, such error could not have been
obvious at the time of trial.
No

See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208.
Prejudice

Finally, Tenney could not prove prejudice caused by the
State's expert testimony.

The gist of the challenged testimony

was that Tenney's misrepresentations were "material" because they
"could have been important or significant to an investor,"
II,

865 P.2d at 1361.

Larsen

See R. 1471 (stating that "material

information is the information that a reasonable investor would
want to know in making an investment decision"); R. 1597 (opining
that information is "material" when it carries "a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would find it important").
However, the Cellwest investors who testified at Tenney's trial
also powerfully conveyed that information:

each testified that

Tenney's sales pitch, with its misrepresentations, had influenced
the investment decision (e.g., R. 1177, 1231, 1242, 1268).

That

testimony gave the jury ample basis to find that Tenney's
misrepresentations were, in fact, "material." Accordingly, had
expert testimony been limited along the lines now urged by
Tenney, there is no likelihood of a better verdict for him.

Thus

no component of "plain error" exists on this point.14
14

The non-Utah cases cited by Tenney are of f-point because each
involves contemporaneous, trial-level objections, and thus "plain
error" is not implicated. United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142
(2nd Cir. 1988), a securities fraud case, condemned an expert's
"repeated use of statutory and regulatory language indicating
guilt" (expert used the term "fraudulent manipulative practices" to
describe the defendant's conduct, id. at 138). .United States
v.
Leuben, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987), as modified, is academically
interesting in that the Fifth Circuit therein held that the
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POINT FOUR
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ANY OF THE
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CHALLENGED BY TENNEY, MOST
OF WHICH HE CHALLENGES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL
Tenney next raises five challenges to the jury
instructions given at his trial.

Conceding that all but part of

his first such challenge were never made in the trial court,
Tenney admits that they must be briefed for "plain error" under
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09 (Br. of Appellant at 38, 42, 44, 49,
51, 53) (the Dunn three-part test for plain error is set forth in
Point Three of this brief).

Once again, Tenney has not proven

prejudicial error--plain or otherwise.
A.

There Was Neither Error Nor Plain Error in the
Jury Instructions that Defined "Employing an
Unregistered Agent."
1.

"Employed as his Agent" (preserved challenge)•

Tenney's first instructional challenge asserts that the
trial court inadequately instructed the jury on the elements of
the crime of employing unregistered securities agents. As framed
by Tenney, this challenge encompasses two subissues--one
preserved, one not.

In the preserved subissue, Tenney challenges

instructions No. 41 and 42, pertaining to his employment of
Steven Rick Jensen and Steven Bowers to sell Cellwest stock.

In

pertinent part, those instructions stated:
question of "materiality" is decided by the judge, not the jury; so
modified, the opinion upheld the prior judgment, 812 F.2d 179, that
defense testimony about "materiality, " in a false loan application
prosecution, was properly excluded. Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698
F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983), involved testimony about contributory
negligence, well off-point from a securities case.
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In order for you to find the defendant, John
B. Tenney, guilty of the crime of "EMPLOYING AN
UNREGISTERED AGENT", as alleged in Count Twentyeight (28) [/ 29] of the Amended Information, you
must find from the evidence all of the following
elements of the crime:
1.

Sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987,
in the State of Utah, John B. Tenney, a
broker-dealer or issuer:

2.

Willfully;

3.

Employed Steven Rick Jensen [/Steven
Bowers];

4.

To offer or sell any security;

5.

To [the specified Cellwest stock
purchasers];

6.

When Steven Rick Jensen [/Steven Bowers]
was not licensed as an agent with the
Utah Division of Securities.

(R. 741-42, boldface caps in original, copied in Br. of Appellant
addendum K).

Tenney preserved this part of his instructional

challenge by asking the trial court to modify element number 3 of
instructions 41 and 42, to state that he "Employed Steven Rick
Jensen [/Steven Bowers] as his
original).

agent"

(R. 374-75, emphasis in

The trial court denied that request, evidently

accepting the State's argument that the phrase "as his agent"
would improperly import common law "agency" doctrine into the law
that governs this case (R. 668).
That decision was correct.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13

(1986) (Br. of Appellant addendum A) defines "agent" for purposes
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, under which Tenney was
prosecuted:
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(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or
issuer in effecting or attempting to effect
purchases or sales of securities. "Agent" does
not include an individual who represents an
issuer, who receives no commission or other
remuneration, directly or indirectly, for
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or
sales of securities in the state, and who:
(a) effects transactions in securities
exempted by Subsection 61-1-14 (1) (a), (b), (c),
(i), or (j);
(b) effects transactions exempted by
Subsection 61-1-14(2); or
(c) effects transactions with existing
employees, partners, officers, or directors of
the issuer
It is a black-letter rule that specific statutory provisions
control over general ones.
(Utah App. 1990).

State v. Moore,

802 P.2d 732, 737

Additionally, because Utah does not recognize

common law crimes, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1995), it
appears that trial courts have no authority to import common law
elements into statutorily-defined crimes.
Therefore, in this case, it would have been improper to
add the phrase "as his agent" to jury instructions 41 and 42.
All that the law required was that Tenney employed Jensen and
Bowers to sell Cellwest stock, and that Jensen and Bowers,
although not duly licensed, were "agents" as defined in Utah
securities law.

Tenney's proposed instructional modification

would have confused the case by interjecting an inapplicable
common law term; at best, the phrase "as his agent" would have
been redundant.

The trial court therefore correctly denied

Tenney's request to add that phrase to the instructions.
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2.

Definition of Agent (unpreserved).

In the second part of this instructional challenge,
Tenney argues that jury instruction 45 did not fully define
"agent" as set forth in section 61-1-13(2), above.

Instruction

45 defined "agent" as "any individual other than a broker-dealer
who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities" (R. 746,
copied in Br. of Appellant addendum K).

The instruction did not

include the statute's exclusion of certain non-compensated
persons, acting under the circumstances delineated in subsections
(2) (a), -(b), and - (c), from the "agent" category.

Because he

did not challenge instruction 45 in the trial court, Tenney again
invokes "plain error" (Br. of Appellant at 38-40) .
No Prejudice:

Tenney'8

Appellate

Mistake

Like his claim discussed in Point Three of this brief,
Tenney again gives only single-sentence treatment to the
"obviousness" and "prejudice" components of plain error under
this point (Br. of Appellant at 39-40).

Tenney's treatment of

the especially-critical "prejudice" component deserves special
mention, because it reflects a fundamentally mistaken view of
plain error.

Tenney's mistake defeats this plain error point,

and all of his subsequent plain error arguments.
Tenney mistakenly believes that he need not prove the
prejudice component of plain error.

That mistake is reflected in

his assertion of prejudice under this point:
[T]he error was prejudicial because the jury could
have convicted Tenney of "Employing Unregistered
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Agents" without making a finding that Tenney
employed Bowers or Jensen "as an agent" as
required and defined by the Act. See Dunn, 850
P.2d at 1209 ("error was prejudicial because :[the
Court] cannot be sure that the jury did not
convict Dunn on the basis of a reckless mental
state alone").
Br. of Appellant at 40. As his parenthetical quotation of Dunn
indicates, Tenney espouses a "cannot be sure" standard for plain
error prejudice; i.e., if this Court "cannot be sure" that the
belatedly-alleged error did not affect the verdict, it should
find reversal-justifying prejudice.
That standard is incorrect.

The "cannot be sure"

standard, utilized by Tenney with no reference to the evidence in
this case, is really equivalent to the standard for finding that
preserved,

constitutional

error is harmless.

Under such

circumstances, the appellant benefits from a presumption that the
error was harmful.

To uphold the judgment, the appellee must

prove that the error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. See,
e.g.,

Verde,

Chapman v.

California,

386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State

v.

770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989).
But the correct standard for prejudice under "plain

error," whether constitutional or non-constitutional in nature,
is the "reasonable likelihood" or "confidence undermining"
standard actually stated in Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09.
Powell,

State

872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau,

P.2d 920, 922-26 & nn. 2-10 (Utah App. 1991).
Point Three of this brief, even preserved

820

As explained in

non-constitutional

error requires the appellant to prove prejudice under the
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v.

"reasonable likelihood" standard in order to win appellate
relief.

Tenney, who never alerted the trial court to the errors

of which he now complains, cannot lay claim to an easier showing
of prejudice than defendants who obey the contemporaneous
objection rule.

See Dunn,

850 P.2d at 1220.

An understanding of "reasonable likelihood" comes from
"counsel ineffectiveness" analysis, which (except for unusual
situations not applicable to this case) utilizes this same
See

standard for prejudice.
668, 694 (1984); State

v.

1989); State v. Ellifritz,

Strickland

Verde,

v.

Washington,

466 U.S.

770 P.2d 116, 124 & n.15 (Utah

835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992).

The standard requires that prejudice be a "demonstrable reality,"
and not mere speculation.
(Utah 1994).

Parsons

v.

Barnes,

871 P.2d 516, 526

Like a defendant who claims trial counsel

ineffectiveness, the plain error claimant must demonstrate how,
in his or her particular case, the unpreserved error affected the
trial court outcome.

See, e.g.,

State

v.

Templin,

805 P.2d 182,

187 (Utah 1990) (prejudice proven by demonstration that counsel
mistake "affected the entire evidentiary picture").
Tenney apparently relies upon State

v.

Jones,

823 P.2d

1059 (Utah 1991) to excuse his failure to brief plain error
prejudice (Br. of Appellant at 4, 39). Jones
him.

Jones

is unavailing to

held that "the complete absence of an elements

instruction on a crime charged" "can never be harmless error,"
and therefore requires reversal as a matter of law, even absent
an objection in the trial court.
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Id.

at 1061.

But Tenney's unpreserved instructional challenges do
not involve a "complete absence" of elements instructions.
Rather, he complains of the lack of instructions pertaining to a
defense that does not apply to his case (this point), or of
allegedly incomplete definitions of certain terms in other
instructions.
Jones,

These are far lesser problems than existed in

823 P.2d at 1061, in which only an "information

instruction" was given, causing per se prejudice.

Tenney7s

"plain error" arguments therefore require the case-specific,
"reasonable likelihood" showing of prejudice, stated in Dunn.
Returning to his challenge to jury instruction 45,
defining "agent," Tenney's plain error argument fails because he
makes no case-specific showing of prejudice.15

He makes no

effort to prove that had instruction 45 included the statutory
exclusions from the definition of "agent," a better verdict would
have been returned on any of the charges against him.

To put it

differently, he proves no reasonable likelihood that the jury
would have found Bowers and Jensen to fall within any of the
statutory exclusions.

For this reason alone, Tenney's plain

error-based argument on this point fails.
No Error,

Nor

Obviousness

Were it proper to reach the question, this Court would
find no error in the instruction's definition of "agent."
15

It is

Additionally, Tenney's citations to non-Utah authority (Br.
of Appellant at 39) cannot prove plain error as defined in Dunn.
However other jurisdictions may define "plain" or "fundamental"
error, they do not provide Tenney an end-run around Utah's threeelement Dunn "plain error" analysis.
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proper to deny a lesser-included offense instruction when no
evidence supports it.
1983).

State

v. Baker,

671 P.2d 152, 157-59 (Utah

It is also proper to delete other types of instructional

language that is unsupported by evidence in the case.
Anderson

v.

Toone,

See, e.g.,

671 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 1983) (error to give

"assumption of risk" language in a negligence case, when there
was no evidence plaintiff knew about risks of activity in
question), overruled

on other

1329, 1334-36 (Utah 1993).

grounds,

Randle

v.

Allen,

862 P.2d

In this case, Tenney identifies no

evidence that either Jensen or Bowers might have come within the
section 61-1-13(2) exclusions from the definition of "agent;"
instead, he simply recites that he asserted such a defense (Br.
of Appellant at 38; R. 757).
That failure is particularly fatal to Tenney's cursory
"obviousness" assertion on this point (Br. of Appellant at 3 940).

The exclusions from the "agent" definition in section 61-1-

13(2) refer the reader to securities transactions falling within
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(1)(a), -(b), -(c), -(i), and-(j); or
within section 61-1-14(2) (1986); or to "transactions with
existing employees, partners, officers, or directors of the
[security] issuer" (statutes copied in Br. of Appellant addendum
A).

These various statutory exclusions from "agent" are

extraordinarily voluminous and complex.

Even if Tenney might now

isolate one such exclusion, and show that it is arguably
supportable by the evidence, the trial court's failure to do so
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sua sponte

cannot be labelled "obvious11 error.16 Therefore,

besides failing to show prejudice, Tenney's plain error challenge
to instruction 45 fails because he shows no obvious error.
B.

There Was No Plain Error in the Jury Instructions
Defining Tenney's Responsibility for the Actions
of his Agents.
Tenney's second instructional challenge asserts that

the jury was inadequately instructed how to find him criminally
liable for the conduct of Jensen and Bowers in making several of
the Cellwest stock sales.17 He makes an unavailing "plain
error" argument on this unpreserved challenge.
No

Prejudice

This instructional challenge fails because Tenney again
fails to apply the correct "reasonable likelihood" standard for
plain error prejudice, as just explained.

Tenney simply states

that it is "impossible to determine" whether the alleged error
had any effect on the verdicts in question (Br. of Appellant at
43).

This again, by itself, defeats his plain error claim.
No Error,

Nor

Obviousness

Were it appropriate to address error or obviousness,
Tenney proves neither.

He directs his challenge against

instruction 52, which stated:

16

All Tenney does is assert, without reference to the
applicable statutes or the evidence, that Cellwest stock was exempt
from the registration requirements of the Securities Act (Br. of
Appellant at 38; R. 757).
17

In his brief, Tenney refers to his responsibility "for the
actions of Bowers, Jensen and others"
(Br. of Appellant at 40,
emphasis added). He does not identify the "others."
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You are instructed that the Defendant is
responsible for any statements made on his behalf
by his authorized salesmen or agents in connection
with any offer or sale of securities. In other
words, if you find from the evidence that such a
salesman or agent made statements to potential
investors and that the Defendant authorized those
statements, then under the law the Defendant is
responsible for the making of those statements as
if he had made them himself.
Similarly, if any authorized agent omitted to
state a material fact, in connection with the
offer or sale of a security, and the Defendant or
agent had a duty to disclose the fact, and you
find that the Defendant did not inform the agent
of the omitted fact, or did not take sufficient
steps to ensure that investors would be informed
of the material fact, the Defendant is responsible
for the omission of the fact as if he himself had
omitted it.
(R. 753, copied in Br. of Appellant addendum L ) .
Instruction 52 correctly states that Tenney was liable
for Jensen's and Bowers' misrepresentations, so long as Tenney
authorized them to speak for him.

Additionally, Tenney does not

acknowledge instruction 53, which stated:
You are instructed that under the laws of the
State of Utah a person is criminally liable for
conduct constituting an offense which he performs
or causes

to be performed

in the name of or on

behalf of a corporation or association to the same
extent as if such conduct were performed in his
own name or behalf.
(Emphasis added).

Instructions 52 and 53 thus accurately

conveyed the principles of criminal liability for the conduct of
others, as set forth by statute:
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who
directly commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally
aids another person to engage in conduct which
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constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995)

IB

A person is criminally liable for conduct
constituting an offense which he performs or
causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf
of a corporation or association to the same extent
as if such conduct were performed in his own name
or behalf.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-205 (1995).

Tenney's effort to prove

"error" in instructions 52 and 53 consists of an attempt to
incorporate common law "agency" doctrine into the instructions.
As already explained, it would have been improper to interject
that doctrine into this criminal case.19

Obviously, then, it

was not error to leave it out.
C.

There Was No Plain Error in Any of the Jury
Instructions Defining Securities Fraud.
Tenney next mounts a two-part, unpreserved attack on

the instructions defining securities fraud.

He first claims

error in the absence of a jury unanimity requirement for deciding
among alternative elements for that offense (Br. of Appellant at
43-44).

Next, he argues that the instructions failed to

18

The mental state required for securities violations
("willfully")/ alluded to in section 76-2-202, was defined in
instruction 54 (R. 755).
19

In fact, Utah's criminal code has its own definition of
"agent," apart from the securities law definition: "'Agent' means
any director, officer, employee, or other person authorized to act
in behalf of a corporation or association." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2201(1) (1995).
Neither this statute nor the * securities code
definition of "agent" support Tenney's effort to interject the
common law rule of "apparent authority" (Br. of Appellant at 40-42)
into this case.
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adequately define the phrase "employed a device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud" (Br. of Appellant at 48).
No

Prejudice

Both of those "plain error" arguments fail because
Tenney again fails to brief "reasonable likelihood" prejudice.
Br. of Appellant at 48 ("no assurance" that the verdicts were
unaffected by absence of "alternative elements unanimity"
instruction); id.

at 50 ("cannot be sure" that allegedly flawed

definitions influenced the verdicts).

Once again, this Court

need not consider the questions of error or obviousness.
No Error,

Nor

Obviousness

Were this Court to address error or obviousness on this
point, it would find neither.

The State addresses Tenney's two

instructional subchallenges in turn.
1.

Unanimity Not Needed for Alternative Elements.

Tenney sets forth an exemplar of the thirteen
securities fraud instructions (one for each named Cellwest
investor) (Br. of Appellant at 43).

Element 5 of that

instruction set forth several alternative ways in which the
requisite "fraud" might be found:
5. [That Tenney] either
a).
b).

c).

employed a device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, OR
made an untrue statement of a material
fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, OR
engaged in an act, practice, or course
of business which operated or would
40

operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.
(R. 713, also copied in Br. of Appellant addendum I).
Tenney cites State
{"Tillman

I"),

("Tillman

II"),

and Tillman

v. Tillman,
v.

Cook,

750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)

855 P.2d 211 (Utah 1993)

to claim that the trial court erroneously failed

to instruct the jury to unanimously agree on which of the fraud
alternatives in element 5 were proven.
opinions in Tillman,
point.

But the bitterly divided

a capital case, do not prove error on this

Repeatedly, the Tillman

opinions tied the jury unanimity

question to legal concerns that are unique to capital penalty
jurisprudence.20

In neither Tillman

opinion did the Utah

Supreme Court overturn its longstanding rule that in a noncapital
case, jurors may be nonunanimous on alternative crime elements,
so long as their ultimate verdict is unanimous.

See Tillman

I,

750 P.2d at at 567 & n.74 (citing Utah precedent).
Admittedly, in a subsequent case, the Utah Supreme
Court, citing Tillman

I,

stated:

"A majority of this Court has

stated that a jury must be unanimous on all elements of a
criminal charge for the conviction to stand."

State

v.

Johnson,

821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah 1991) (attempted capital murder:
20

E.g.,
Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 566 (plurality opinion on this
issue, citing and discussing Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238
(1972), and related cases); id. at 578-79 (Stewart, J., concurring
in result on this issue, and rejecting non-unanimity rule "in
connection with aggravating circumstances in capital
homicide
cases"
(emphasis added)); Tillman
II,
855 P.2d at 216 (stating
Tillman I court's majority view that "jurors are constitutionally
required to agree unanimously on each element of a criminal
offense, including at least one aggravating circumstance in a
capital
offense"
(emphasis added)).
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"poison" aggravator not proven; court could not uphold verdict on
alternative "pecuniary gain" aggravator absent special verdict
showing that jury found it to be present).

Even so, the court

has not expressly overruled its pre-Tillman cases, e.g.,
Russell,

Indeed, in State v.

871 P.2d 540, 546-47 (Utah 1994), the supreme court

invoked Russell

to uphold a second degree murder conviction

against an "alternative elements unanimity" challenge.

Finally,

one supreme court member (the swing vote on the issue in
I),

v.

733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987), holding that unanimity among

alternative crime elements is not required.
Goddard,

State

Tillman

has criticized special verdicts in criminal cases, which

would be needed to assure juror unanimity among alternative crime
elements.

See State v. Bell,

770 P.2d 100, 111-13 (Utah 1988)

(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (special
verdicts may deprive jury of its "mercy" function).21
Given this unsettled case law, even if it might have
been error to omit an "alternative elements unanimity"
instruction, such error could not have been "obvious" to the
trial court.

Quite the contrary, to the extent that the

unanimity requirement, in its several contexts, has caused the
Utah Supreme Court to "struggle," State

21

v. Saunders,

893 P.2d

J2ussell contains an excellent explanation why juror unanimity
on alternative crime elements is unnecessary: such a requirement
would cause overlong deliberations and hung juries in instances
when all jurors agree that the accused committed the charged crime.
733 P.2d at 167-68 (citing cases). And in Schad v. Arizona,
501
U.S. 624, 630-45 (1991), a United States Supreme Court plurality
saw no useful purpose to an "alternative elements unanimity"
requirement in a capital murder prosecution.
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584, 589 (Utah App. 1995), no "obvious" error exists on this
point.

Absent settled, well-known, controlling precedent, there

can be no obvious error.
2.

"Device, Scheme, or Artifice to Defraud.11

Nor could this Court find obvious error in the absence
of instructions defining "device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud," one of the alternative ways of committing fraud under
element 5 of the securities fraud instruction.22

Tenney

asserts, without explanation, that "device," "scheme," and
"artifice," taken directly from Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1986),
are not self-defining (Br. of Appellant at 49). However,
instructions given in statutory language are generally deemed
sufficient.

State v. Swan, 31 Utah 336, 88 P. 12, 15 (1906).

Further, even on appeal, Tenney offers no guidance on
how "device," "scheme," and "artifice" should have been defined.
See Swan, 88 P. at 14 ("Counsel do not state, nor would it be an
easy matter to define, just what should be stated . . . " ) .

Just

as failure to proffer an alternative instruction can waive an
instructional challenge at the trial level, State

v.

Schoenfeld,

545 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1976), such failure should also doom an
unpreserved, "plain error" challenge.

And as Tenney admits (Br.

of Appellant at 49), Utah case law has never addressed the point.
Thus even if error might be found, Tenney has not proven the
"obviousness" component of plain error.
22

Saunders,

893 P.2d at

Under Tenney's "alternative element unanimity" theory, the
jury would be required to identify whether Tenney employed a
"device," or a "scheme," or an "artifice."
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589 (lack of clear Utah case law defeats "obviousness" showing
for plain error).
D.

There Was No Plain Error in the Instructions
Defining "Unregistered Broker or Agent•"
Tenney's next unpreserved complaint is that jury

instruction 40, defining the crime of being an unregistered
securities broker, fails to adequately define "agent" or "brokerdealer."

Tenney again fails to apply the correct prejudice

standard for this contention of "plain error."

Br. of Appellant

at 51 ("This Court cannot be sure that the jury convicted Tenney
based on a correct definition of these terms").

Therefore, this

"plain error" point fails.
No Error,

Nor

Obviousness

Tenney's claim of obvious error on this point would
fail for the reasons outlined earlier (Point IV-A), addressing
his challenge to the instructions on "employing unregistered
agents."

That is, Tenney identifies no evidence to support a

possible finding that he fell within the statutory exclusions to
the definitions of "agent" or "broker-dealer," under Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-13(2) and -(3) (1993).

Therefore, there was no basis

to instruct the jury on those exceptions.

Without supporting

evidence, it would have more likely been error to give such
instructions.

Therefore, the "obviousness" element of plain

error also could not be satisfied on this point.
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E.

Tenney's Redundant "Alternative Element Unanimity"
Argument Does Not Prove Plain Error on Appeal.
Tenney's final "plain error" challenge to the jury

instructions repeats his argument that the jury should have been
told to unanimously state which of several possible theories it
applied to find him guilty of securities fraud.

Once more,

Tenney fails to prove the necessary prejudice in his desultory
statement that there is "no assurance" that the belatedly-alleged
errors did not affect the verdicts (Br. of Appellant at 52, 53).
Once more, this defeats the plain error claim.
No Error,

Nor

Obviousness

Tenney's final "elements unanimity" argument (Br. of
Appellant at 52) does not only repeat his prior focus on the
elements of security fraud (discussed in Point IV-C-1 of this
brief); he apparently also attacks instructions related to the
other criminal counts. However, he does not specify which other
instructions are "obviously erroneous" for lack of unanimity
requirements.

See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (appellate argument

must contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and
of the record

relied on" (emphasis added)).

parts

The State cannot

respond to this "invisible plain error" assertion; nor should
this Court address it.
Be that as it may, Tenney's argument on this point
repeats his questionable premise (as explained in Point IV-C-1),
that jury unanimity is required among alternative crime elements,
and that failure to so instruct a jury amounts to obvious error.
"Saying the same thing twice gives it no more weight."
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Hammer v.

Gross,

932 F.2d 842, 852 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Kozinski, J.,

concurring).

Therefore, this Court should reject this final,

unpreserved instructional challenge.23
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED TENNEY'S
"JUROR MISCONDUCT"-BASED NEW TRIAL MOTION
In his penultimate point on appeal, Tenney argues that
the trial court should have granted his post-verdict motion for a
new trial.

Tenney moved for mistrial upon learning that one of

the jurors, Dr. Barnett, had briefly discussed the case with Dr.
Christensen, who was acquainted with Tenney, during a recess
following trial day five.

See affidavits of Barnett,

Christensen, and Margaret Wallace (R. 791-94, 804-06, copied in
Br. of Appellant addendum D ) .
In that conversation, juror Barnett remarked that
Tenney appeared to be "really a bad guy," or "a slick operator"
(R. 792, 805) . Christensen responded that "my experiences with
John Tenney had all been good" (R. 792). Juror Barnett then
acknowledged that "I shouldn't talk about it at all" (Christensen
affid. at R. 792), or that "I would have to wait until after
hearing all the evidence before I decided" (Barnett affid. at R.
805).

By stipulation, Tenney's new trial motion was decided on

the affidavits and memoranda (R. 807-11, copied in appendix IV of
this brief).

23

Tenney's argument on this point also repeats his previous
argument that common law "agency" doctrine belonged in the jury
instructions, addressed in Point IV-B of this brief.
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A.

The Standard of Review.
As Tenney indicates (Br. of Appellant at 61, point

heading), the trial court's denial of his new trial motion should
be deferentially reviewed for "abuse of discretion."
v. Pena,

See

869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State v. Wetzel,

State
868 P.2d

64, 70 (Utah 1993) . Deference is appropriate because the trial
court's ruling required application of "juror misconduct"
principles to unique circumstances, including the likely impact
of the alleged misconduct on the verdicts.
939.

Compare

Crookston

v.

Fire

Ins.

See Pena,

Exchange,

869 P.2d at

860 P.2d 937, 938

(Utah 1993) (new trial ruling is reviewed nondeferentially if it
turns on a narrow legal premise).
B«

No Presumption of Prejudice.
The condition for deferential review, of course, is

that the trial court apply the correct legal analysis.

In this

case, the court applied a two-part test for prejudicial juror
misconduct, from Arellano

v.

298 P.2d 527, 529-30 (1956):

Western

Pac.

R.

Co.,

5 Utah 2d 146,

First, did juror Barnett violate

the Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (j) admonition "not . . . to converse with
. . . any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it
is [the jurors'] duty not to form or express an opinion thereon
until the case is finally submitted to them"?

Second, if Barnett

disobeyed that admonition, was there prejudice; i.e., did the
misconduct affect the verdict?24
24

The Arellano
analysis was offered by the State, opposing
Tenney's new trial motion on this point, and was accepted by the
trial court, as indicated in its minute entry denying the new trial
47

That analysis is appropriate in light of the fact that
the problem in this case did not involve an "improper contact[]
between jurors and witnesses, attorneys, or court personnel,"
State v. Pike,

712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1985), which would give

rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, id.
Accord

State

v. Erickson,

Swain,

835 P.2d 1009 (Utah App. 1992); Logan City

at 280.

749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987); State

P.2d 224 (Utah App. 1990).

v.

v.

Carlsen,

799

Juror Barnett's conversation was with

a person unrelated to the case under trial.
Admittedly, a presumption of prejudice has been said to
exist in cases involving juror conversations with persons who
were not witnesses, attorneys, or court personnel.
Remmer v.

United

States,

See,

e.g.,

347 U.S. 227 (1954) (rebuttable

presumption of prejudice arose from juror's approach by stranger
who remarked that juror could profit from a verdict of acquittal;
remand hearing ordered to determine actual prejudice); State
Thome,

v.

39 Utah 208, 117 P. 58, 66-67 (1911) (conviction reversed

because of phone call made by juror, in violation of admonition
and without permission, and of unknown nature).
recently, in Smith

v. Phillips,

But more

455 U.S. 209 (1982), the United

States Supreme Court has disavowed presumed prejudice, or
"implied bias," from questionable outside-of-trial juror
conversations.

Instead, the Court held that the right to an

impartial jury is adequately protected when the litigant has

motion (R. 801, 809).
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opportunity to explore allegations of juror misconduct, and to
demonstrate prejudice caused thereby.

Id.

at 215-18.

In this case, involving a brief conversation with a
person having no part in the trial, and with the content of the
conversation revealed, the Pike presumption of prejudice ought
not apply.
Phillips,

Tenney had the opportunity, in accord with Smith

v.

for an evidentiary hearing to explore whether the

alleged misconduct was prejudicial.

He opted instead to submit

the issue for decision on the affidavits of Barnett, Christensen,
and Wallace (R. 807). Under these circumstances, the trial court
was not required to apply a presumption of prejudice.
the court properly applied the Arellano

Instead,

analysis, so that

deferential appellate review is appropriate.
C.

No Abuse of Discretion Occurred.
1.

Juror "May Have" Violated Admonition.

The trial court equivocally found that juror Barnett
"may have violated rule 17 (j), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
by briefly conversing with another doctor about defendant's
business practices" (R. 810-11, copied in appendix IV of this
brief).

Because rule 17 (j) does not allow jurors to discuss

their pending case at all, the trial court properly found that
Barnett violated that part of the admonition.
However, the trial court also found that "Dr. Barnett's
actions did not indicate that he had formed an opinion or bias
against defendant" (R. 811). That finding, supported by the
submitted affidavits, indicates that Barnett had not violated the
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admonition "not to form or express an opinion" until the case was
submitted.

That finding is not clearly erroneous.

Additionally, the trial court's "possible violation"
ruling reflects a legitimate judgment that juror Barnett's
violation was not extreme.

The involved persons agreed that the

Barnett-Christensen conversation was brief, and included
Barnett's acknowledgment of his duty not to discuss the case
(Christensen affid. at R. 792; Barnett affid. at R. 805). Juror
Barnett's comments did not show "a state of mind . . . with
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent
him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights" of Tenney, the standard for juror bias under
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e) (14) : after all, he acknowledged that he
"would have to wait until after hearing all of the evidence
before I decided" Tenney's case (Barnett affid. at R. 805).
2.

No Resulting Prejudice.

Given the brief nature of the Barnett-Christensen
conversation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
finding no "indication that the actions [of Barnett] would impact
on the juror's deliberation in the case" (R. 811). Indeed, it is
self-evident that any prejudice wrought by that conversation
worked against the State, rather than Tenney, because Christensen
volunteered his view that Tenney was of good character, telling
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juror Barnett, "[M]y experiences with John Tenney had all been
good" (Christensen affid. at R. 792).25
Tenney therefore struggles, by longshot speculation, to
demonstrate prejudice.

See Br. of Appellant at 66 ("Juror

Barnett may well have disliked his office mate or had some
ongoing dispute which left him with no respect for the other
dentist.

Knowledge that the other dentist knew and admired

Tenney may well have impacted negatively on Juror Barnett").
This is an especially dubious speculation given that Barnett and
Christensen shared office space for their dental practices
(Wallace affid., R. 793). And having waived an evidentiary
hearing to more thoroughly explore the prejudice question (R.
807), Tenney cannot now demonstrate that the trial court abused
its discretion in finding that no prejudice arose from juror
Barnett's improper conversation.
D.

"Incidental and Brief Contact."
Finally, this Court can affirm the trial court's

judgment on this point under the familiar principle that valid
alternative grounds also support it.
Gallegos,

See,

e.g.,

712 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985); State

P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991).

State

v.

v. Elder,

815

The trial court's denial

of Tenney's juror misconduct-based new trial motion can be

25

In Logan City v. Carlsen,
799 P.2d at 226, this Court stated
that reversal would be required if the improper juror-bailiff
conversation "benefitted either the defendant or the City[.]" The
notion that defendant-benefitting prejudice warrants a new trial,
however, is not supported by any citation to authority, and lacks
any apparent logical basis.
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alternatively affirmed on the ground that the conversation
between juror Barnett and Dr. Christensen was merely a brief,
"incidental contact" that could not have had any impact upon
Barnett's deliberations.

See Pike,

712 P.2d at 279-80;

Carlsen,

799 P.2d at 226.
The submitted affidavits readily support such a
conclusion.

Again, Dr. Christensen's affidavit--submitted by

Tenney--reflects that the conversation consisted of but five or
six sentences, ending with juror Barnett's statement that he
could not discuss the case (R. 791-92).

The affidavit of

Margarent Wallace (R. 793-94), who overheard the conversation,
similarly recounts a very brief exchange.

These affidavits

corroborate juror Barnett's own account of a brief conversation,
centered on the coincidence that Dr. Christensen happened to know
defendant Tenney (R. 804-05).

In sum, on the grounds identified

by the trial court, or on this alternative ground, the trial
court's denial of Tenney's "juror misconduct"-based new trial
motion should be affirmed.
POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED TENNEY TO
PAY $39,000 RESTITUTION TO CELLWEST INVESTOR
ZIEGLOWSKY
Tenney's final appellate contention is that the trial
court erroneously ordered him to pay $39,000 restitution to
defrauded Cellwest investor James Zieglowsky.

At a post-verdict

restitution hearing (R. 2365-84, copied in appendix V) Tenney,
then represented by professional counsel, stipulated to $53,950
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restitution owed to nine other investors (R. 2366) .

Tenney also

agreed to try the restitution issue by proffer with respect to
Zieglowsky (R. 2365).
The Zieglowsky dispute exists because Zieglowsky
purchased his Cellwest stock via real property and mortgage
transactions, rather than by cash.

Under those contracts, Tenney

was to assume rent collection and mortgage payment responsibility
for the real property.

He defaulted those obligations, forcing

Zieglowsky to pay arrearages on one parcel, and to suffer
foreclosure on another (R. 2367-2374).

Although Tenney contested

the nature of his obligations toward the subject property, the
State introduced supporting documentation in the form of
quitclaim deeds, mortgage agreements, and the like (R. 2386) .
By proffer, Tenney acknowledged that he owed Zieglowsky
$20,000 (R. 2375).

The trial court expressed an inclination to

order double restitution, as permitted by statute (R. 2384) .

In

the end, upon review of the parties' memoranda, the trial court
accepted the State's proffer and documentary evidence, finding
Zieglowsky's loss to be $39,000, and ordered restitution in that
amount (R. 2501-04 Order, copied in Br. of Appellant addendum
E) .26 Due to his trial court acknowledgment, Tenney really only
disputes $19,000 of the restitution order to Zieglowsky.

26

The parties' restitution memoranda were not included in the
record on appeal.
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A.

The Standard of Review.
Tenney properly identifies the standard of review (Br.

of Appellant at 4-5): restitution orders are reviewed
deferentially for "abuse of discretion."

State v. Snyder,

P.2d 417, 422 (Utah 1987); State v. Robinson,
81 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Twitchell,
App. 1992).

747

860 P.2d 979, 980-

832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah

Disregarding this standard in his argument, Tenney

attempts to convert this issue to one of constitutional due
process.

He contends, "As can be seen from the proffers,

Appellant did not have an opportunity to be fully heard and the
trial judge did not receive sufficient evidence to accurately
calculate the damages in this case" (Br. of Appellant at 68-69) .
That contention is meritless. As already recited,
Tenney expressly (and with assistance of counsel) agreed to try
the restitution issue by proffer (R. 2365) . In other words,
Tenney voluntarily relinquished his right to be "fully heard" and
to offer "sufficient evidence" about the amount of restitution.
To now entertain Tenney's "due process" argument would encourage
invited error, contrary to sound, settled principle.
850 P.2d at 1220; Tillman
40-41.

I,

See Dunn,

750 P.2d at 553 n.20, 560-61 & nn.

This Court should reject Tenney's due process challenge

to the restitution order.
This Court should also reject Tenney's argument that
"the amount of damages which James Zieglowsky sustained involves
a complex question which would be better left to.civil
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litigation" (Br. of Appellant at 69). The Utah legislature has
decided that restitution can be ordered in criminal cases:
When a person is convicted of criminal
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages,
in addition to any other sentence it may impose,
the court shall order that the defendant make
restitution up to double the amount of pecuniary
damages to the victim or victims of the offense of
which the defendant has been convicted, or to the
victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by
the defendant to the sentencing court.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (1995) (emphasis added) .
Tenney does not argue that this statute is unconstitutional
beyond reasonable doubt, State
1989).

v. Bell,

785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah

That, however, is the showing he would have to make in

order to prove that the trial court was required to relegate
Zieglowsky's restitution to civil litigation.

Because the court

acted as the valid, governing criminal statute requires, the
standard for reviewing the Zieglowsky restitution order remains
highly deferential.
B.

No Abuse of Discretion in Restitution Order.
The trial court did not abuse its section 76-3-201

discretion in the restitution order.

As already recited, most of

the disputed $19,000 was related to one parcel of property.
While Tenney disputed the nature of the agreement between him and
Zieglowsky with respect to that parcel (R. 2379-80), the State
produced documentary evidence tending to show that the agreement
existed, and was breached by Tenney, therefore causing the
financial loss (R. 2386) •
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Additionally, analogous to its prerogative to decide
which opposing testimony to believe, e.g.,

State

v. Walker,

743

P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987), the trial court surely had
discretion to choose between the State's and Tenney's proffers
about the total amount of Zieglowsky's loss.

That being the

case, Tenney must show "clear error" in the trial court's
acceptance of the State's $39,000 proffer, as opposed to the
$20,000 proffered by Tenney.

This is especially true given that

the State presented documentary evidence on the $19,000 disputed
balance.

But Tenney attempts no such showing.

That being the

case, this Court should hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in ordering Tenney to pay $39,000 restitution for
the loss suffered by Mr. Zieglowsky.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Tenney's convictions,
sentences, and restitution order should be AFFIRMED.

Given the

length of the parties' briefs and the novelty of the subject
matter, the State is inclined to agree with Tenney's request for
oral argument.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *2Q day of September,
1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY
U
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Recommended Colloquy for
Self-Representation Requests
Discussion re: Manner of Testimony
(R. 1723-28)

RECOMMENDED COLLOQUY WITH PROSPECTIVE PRO SE DEFENDANTS
from
State

v. Frampton,
737 P.2d 183, 187-88 n.12 (Utah 1987),
quoting Bench Book for United States District Court Judges,
vol. 1 §§ 1.02-2 to -5 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed.
1986) :
An accused has a constitutional right to represent
himself if he chooses to do so. A defendant's waiver of
counsel must, however, be knowing and voluntary. This means
that you must make clear on the record that the defendant is
fully aware of the hazards that he faces and the
disadvantages of self-representation.
When a defendant states that he wishes to represent
himself, you should therefore ask questions similar to the
following:
(a) Have you ever studied law?
(b) Have you ever represented yourself or any other
defendant in a criminal action?
(c) You realize, do you not, that you are charged with
these crimes: (Here state the crimes with which the
defendant is charged.)
(d) You realize, do you not, that if you are found
guilty of the crime charged in Count I, the court . . .
could sentence you to as much as
years in prison and
fine you as much as $
? (Then ask him a similar question
with respect to each other crime with which he may be
charged in the indictment or information.)
(e) You realize, do you not, that if you are found
guilty of more than one of those crimes this court can order
that the sentences be served consecutively, that is, one
after another?
(f) You realize, do you not, that if you represent
yourself, you are on your own? I cannot tell you how you
should try your case or even advise you as to how to try
your case.
(g) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Evidence?
(h) You realize, do you not, that the . . . Rules of
Evidence govern what evidence may or may not be introduced
at trial and, in representing yourself, you must abide by
those rules?

(i) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Criminal
Procedure?
(j) You realize, do you not, that those rules govern
the way in which a criminal action is tried in . . . court?
(k) You realize, do you not, that if you decide to take
the witness stand, you must present your questions by asking
questions of yourself? You cannot just take the stand and
tell your story. You must proceed question by question
through your testimony.
(1) (Then say to the defendant something to this
effect): I must advise you that in my opinion you would be
far better defended by a trained lawyer than you can be by
yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent
yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not
familiar with court procedure. You are not familiar with
the Rules of Evidence. I would strongly urge you not to try
to represent yourself.
(m) Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer
if you are found guilty and in light of all the difficulties
of representing yourself, is it still your desire to
represent yourself and to give up your right to be
represented by a lawyer?
(n) Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part?
(o) If the answers to the two preceding questions are
in the affirmative, you should then say something to the
following effect: "I find that the defendant has knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. I will
therefore permit him to represent himself."
(p) You should consider the appointment of standby
counsel to assist the defendant and to replace him if the
court should determine during trial that the defendant can
no longer be permitted to represent himself.

1

attention immediately wh n we reconvene on this

2

particular matter.
Now, if yo

3

recall what I explained to

4

you earlier this week, i 's impossible for me to

5

continue this trial on M ndays because I have a full

6

calendar on Mondays aire dy, so we will be reconvening

7

this case on Tuesday.

8

THE CLERK:

9:00.

9

THE COURT:

It will be 9:00 o'clock,

10

Apparently we don't have any other

11

matters scheduled on Tue day except for this case,

12

I'll ask, as well, that

13

exhibit books.

14

They will be redistribut d on Tuesday,

15

ou gather your note pads and

I will h ve Rod collect all of those,

I hope you have a nice weekend.

I'm

16

going to excuse you at t is time, and I will expect to

17

see you Tuesday promptly at 9:00 o'clock,

18

(Jury Excu ed for the day.)

19

THE COURT:

20
21
22
23

The record may reflect --

you may be seated.
By the way

all parties are present; the

Jury is not present at t! is time.
Mr. Tenney

I want to take care of a

24

procedural issue which w 11 also serve the purpose of

25

giving you some advance i otice, as well, and that is
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x

wins;

xi.

ywu

2

you are going to testify in this particular case, of

3

course, as you are aware, the law gives you the

4

constitutional right not to testify in this particular

5

case.

6

regarding how we are going to handle that

7

procedurally.

t«ts

ucuibiuiw

nL •

xenney

f

tucit

Do you understand the issue that I am
raising?

10

MR. TENNEY:

11

brought it up.

12

issue.

13
14

uiauc

I think I ought to give you some advance notice

8
9

nave

I do.

I am glad you

I was going to bring up the same

THE COURT:

Tell me what you want to

bring up about that issue?

15

MR. TENNEY:

As I understand, there are

16

a couple of possibilities as to just how we might do

17

this:

18

formulated, and I give answers.

19

having Patrick Anderson do that.

20

One is to have someone read questions that I
And I thought about

However, another procedure would be to

21

simply use a narrative approach.

22

narrative approach simply because I want to impress

23

the Jury with the fact that I am pro se.

24

conducted my case pro se from the very beginning.

25

the Court has, at this point, not allowed Patrick
218
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1

Anderson, really, to express himself orally.

So that

2

would be my preference.

3

discretion of the Court as to how this should be

4

done.

5

it.

But I'm certainly at the

But that would be the way I would prefer to do

6

THE COURT:

Thank you.

7

Ms. Barlow.

8

MS. BARLOW:

9

prefer the other fashion.

Your Honor, the State would
It f s very difficult in a

10

narrative fashion to cull out the things that are

11

inadmissible and to allow us to object every two

12

seconds when he gets into something that might be

13

considered closing argument, as it were.

14

I think if questions can be formulated

15

and it can be conducted

16

which is, I think, the way that it is usually

17

conducted, when you have both sides asking questions,

18

I think that that would be preferable.

19

in a professional fashion,

In a narrative fashion, you get into all

20

sorts of things that may or may not be relevant to

21

what we are doing here.

22

in a bad light to be objecting every so often when he

23

says things.

24
25

THE COURT:

And, frankly, it might put us

You then have no objection

with Mr* Tenney's first alternative, with having him
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1

draft his own questions and having Mr. Anderson

2

read the questions drafted by Mr. Tenney?

3
4

MS. BARLOW:

THE COURT:

6

talking about procedure.

7

But the proper -- we are

MS. BARLOW:

The procedure, we have no

problem with.

9
10

We may object to the form

of a question.

5

8

simply

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's do it this

way.

11

MR. TENNEY:

If we did that, would

12

Patrick Anderson -- Mr. Anderson have any leeway to

13

expand on the questions?

14

give a copy of questions to the State, or would he be

15

able to ask the questions the way that he sees fit?

16
17

In other words, do I need to

THE COURT:

No.

This is what I am going

to require --

18

MR. TENNEY:

19

THE COURT:

Okay.
•- assuming Mr. Tenney were

20

to testify -- and we don't know that as of yet -- but

21

assuming he were to testify, what I'm going to

22

require, Mr. Tenney, is that you, in fact, draft the

23

questions.

24

that you disclose those questions to the State.

25

am going to require you to have those questions

I am not going to require at this point
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1
2

drafted in written form*
I am going to allow Mr* Anderson to put

3

those questions to you, but he will be required to put

4

those questions to you exactly as you have prepared

5

them in written form.

6

Additionally, what I am going to

7

require, Mr. Tenney, is that, prior to your testimony,

8

if you testify, I am going to require that you submit

9

to this Court a copy of those instructions that

10
11

Mr. Anderson will be reading to you.
And the sole purpose of that is:

At

12

this point, I am not going to disclose those questions

13

to the State, but I must have some way of showing that

14

Mr. Anderson is simply reading the questions that you

15

have -- reading the questions verbatim that you have

16

prepared in written form.

17

And the reason why I am going to do it

18

that way versus just a outright narrative is that I

19

think it's more -- more appropriate for the State to

20

have the opportunity to interpose timely objections to

21

the questions, and it's extremely difficult to do that

22

in a narrative form in a proper manner.

23

proceed in that manner.

So we will

24

Mr. Anderson, did you have a question?

25

MR. ANDERSON:
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1

may:

Who will be handling the objections when the

2

State interposes those?

3

Mr. Tenney or myself.

THE COURT:

Mr. Tenney will be required

4

to handle the objections.

5

procedure will be any problem at all.

6

I don't see where that

MR. ANDERSON:

And Mr. Tenney has

7

expressed the concern to me many times that he wants

8

to preserve -- as he expressed to you -- his pro se

9

status.

I just request that —

10

the Jury of that.

11

for the questions.

12

the Court has informed

I'm just basically the mouthpiece

THE COURT:

I will inform the Jury of

13

the procedure, that you are not posing these questions

14

on your own, that these are the questions drafted by

15

Mr. Tenney.

16

And to avoid a situation where

17

Mr. Tenney asks himself the question and repeats his

18

own answers, this seems to be a more efficient,

19

realistic manner of handling it by allowing

20

Mr. Anderson simply to read the question.

21
22

So I will give the Jury those
instructions.

23

Okay, we will recess at this time.

24

MS. BARLOW:

25

Your Honor, if I may just

put something on the record?
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APPENDIX II

"Prosecutor Misconduct"-based Mistrial Motion
and Trial Court's Ruling Denying Motion
(R. 579-80, 1671-81)

JOHN B. TENNEY
Pro Se
8415 Kings Hill Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 942-8144

Third Judicial District

MAY 2 1 1993
^

SAlTLAKECOunilY

IN THE DISTRICT C O U R T OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

A

Deputy Ctofk

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL

Plaintiff,
V.

JOHN B. TENNEY,

Case No. 921901056FS
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

Defendant.
The prosecutor statfed in her opening statement that, this
case is about people being taken by a smooth talking salesman who
"defrauded" three hundred ana thirty-three people out of their
money.

This statement as well as the theme of the prosecutor's

opening statement is not supported by any evidence in the record.
Since the prosecution has rested and since the burden is on the
state to come forth with all evidence necessary to support their
allegations, Mr. Tenney herein moves for a mistrial based on the
prejudicial and unsupported statements made during the prosecutor's
opening statement.
Court's follow the general rule that, Mthe assertion of
facts in an opening statement which are not proved during trial may
constitute grounds for a mistrial if there is a reasonable
possibility that the admissible evidence contributed to the
conviction."

State v. West, 617 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Mont. 1980).

00579

See

also State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) (counsel is obligated
to avoid reference to those matters the jury is not justified in
considering, and where there was no compelling proof of defendant's
guilt, court concluded reversal was required because jurors probably
were influenced by the improper remarks).
The Court has already ruled that the prejudicial affect of
the shareholder list outweighed the probative value of its
admission.

In suppressing the introduction of the shareholder list,

the Court expressed its concern over the impact such a list would
have upon the jury.

This concern is magnified when applied to the

opening statement declaration that Mr. Tenney had "defrauded" three
hundred and thirty-three people.

This evidence has not been

solicited through the state's factual witnesses and the mere numbers
is highly inflammatory and prejudicial to Mr. Tenney.
Approximately, the first sentence out of the prosecutor's
mouth referred to Mr. Tenney "defrauding" three hundred and
thirty-three people.

The primacy of this statement and the

inability of the state to bring forward any evidence of any
shareholder being defrauded, beyond the thirteen listed in the
information, establishes a reasonable possibility that the
inadmissible evidence would contribute to a conviction.

State v.

West, 617 P.d at 1300. Therefore, this court should grant Mr.
Tenney's motion for a mistrial.
DATED this *)J( J? day of May, 1993.

IBTTENNEY
Se

t
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1

(Jury leaves.)

2

THE COURT:
has been

The record may reflect that

3

the Jury

4

parties are present, however.

5
6

excused

from

the

the

courtroom.

The

Mr. Tenney, you have a motion which
you'd like to make?

7

MR. TENNEY:

Yes, I do, your Honor.

The

8

motion I'd like to make, I've just handed to you in

9

written form.

10

I'd like to just orally make this

motion and argue it very briefly.

11

This is a motion for a mistrial.

And

12

the basis for this motion is that the Prosecutor, Lynn

13

Nicholas, stated in her opening statement that this

14

case is a case about people being taken by a

15

smooth-talking salesman who, quote, defrauded 333

16

people out of their money.

17

This statement, as well as the theme of

18

the Prosecutor's opening statement, is not supported

19

by evidence in the record.

20

has rested and since the burden is on the State to

21

come forward with all the evidence that's necessary to

22

support their allegations, I move for a mistrial based

23

on the very serious prejudicial and unsupported

24

statement made during the opening statement by the

25

State.
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1

The Court, of course, follows the

2

general rule that, quote, the assertion of facts in an

3

opening statement which are not proved during trial

4

may constitute grounds for a mistrial if there is a

5

reasonable possibility that the admissible evidence

6

contributed to the conviction, end of quote.

7

quoting from State v. West 617 —

8

at 1298.

THE COURT:

MR. TENNEY:

I don't have it.

I am

sorry, yes, I do.

13
14

Do you have a copy of that

case?

11
12

quoted in 617 P.2d

It's a Montana 1980 case.

9
10

That's

THE CODRT:

Go ahead.

Are you through,

Mr. Tenney?

15

MR. TENNEY:

Not quite.

The —

counsel

16

is obligated to avoid any reference to any matters

17

that the jury is not justified

18

I've argued forcefully earlier today, this is, I

19

think, a very serious prejudicial error.

20

there is no compelling proof of my guilt, the court in

21

this case concluded that reversal was required

22

the jurors probably were influenced by the improper

23

remarks.

24
25

in considering.

And as

And where

because

I think it is unquestionable that the
Jurors believe that there are 333 stockholders in the
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1

company based upon the statements made by the

2

statements made by the State in the opening

3

statement*

4

The Court has already ruled that the

5

prejudicial effect of this Stockholder List or

6

Shareholder List has outweighed probative value.

7

in suppressing the introduction of the Shareholders

8

List, the Court also expressed its concern over the

9

impact that this list would have on the Jury.

So,

And

10

it's magnified when we apply it to the opening

11

statement that Mr. Tenney, quote, defrauded 333

12

people.

13

the State's factual witnesses, and the mere numbers

14

are highly inflammatory and prejudicial to me,

15

Mr. Tenney.

16

The evidence has not been solicited through

Nearly the very first heard sentence out

17

of the Prosecutor's mouth referred to me as, quote,

18

defrauding 333 people.

19

the inability of the State to bring forward any

20

evidence of any such claim of any shareholder being

21

defrauded, other than those they've brought into the

22

court here as witnesses, establishes, clearly, a

23

reasonable possibility that the inadmissible evidence

24

would, in fact, contribute to a conviction.

25

This statement and the fact of

As I stated earlier, I'm greatly
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1

concerned about the effect it would have on the minds

2

and hearts of the Jurors.

3

here from State v. West, at 617 P.2d at 1300.

4

And, again, we are quoting

For this reason, the Court should grant

5

my motion for a mistrial at this time.

6

THE COURT:

7

Miss Barlow?

8

MS. BARLOW:

Thank you*

Thank you, Mr. Tenney.

Your Honor, I would like to

9

first correct -- the statement that Ms. Nicholas made

10

was that John Tenney deliberately defrauded dozens of

11

innocent -- excuse me, decent people, 333 people,

12

mostly citizens of Utah, were taken by that man for a

13

lot of money.

14

said.

15

So maybe to get correctly what was

She never did say he defrauded 333 people.
But that's —

the significant point is

16

that —

17

remember if that's the actual case name.

But there is

18

a case -- I believe it's State v. Troy —

that says

19

there are certain matters -- well, when the Court is

20

looking at prosecutorial misconduct, which is what the

21

claim is here, the Court has a two-prong test:

22

did the person -- did the prosecutor say something

23

that the jury was not supposed to be privy to, and

24

then, number two, did it prejudice the case?

25

and I believe it's State v. Troy.

I can't

One,

Granted, we mentioned 333 people because i
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1

we thought at that time we'd get the Shareholder List

2

in.

3

in by the end of this trial.

I am not at all sure that we still won't get it

4

I don't know.

But more significantly, this Court

5

directed —

6

were not to take anything that was said in opening

7

statements as evidence.

8

this 333 people statement, then Mr* Tenney can argue

9

that in closing argument.

10

as I recall, directed the Jury that they

And if we have not proven up

But I submit this Jury is a very

11

attentive jury.

12

that sat there listening Ms. Nicholas in opening

13

statement and thought, "Oh, there must be 333 people"

14

if we don't present that evidence.

15

for believing that this jury has already convicted

16

Mr. Tenney of defrauding

17

And I don't think they are a jury

There is no basis

333 people.

And since there is no basis for

18

believing that, although the statement, perhaps

19

well, in hindsight, now, since we have not yet got

20

that Stockholders List in, in hindsight, perhaps might

21

not -- perhaps should not have been said, and perhaps

22

is something that the Jury should not have been privy

23

to, but there is no prejudice.

24

statement*

25

—

It was opening

I submit that, while this Montana Case
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A© iiiucicsLiii^ f At At> nuntana r a m e r

2

notice, on Page 1,300, that they seem to follow this

3

prejudice prong just as Utah follows it*

4

importantly, the Utah case law is that you have to

5

establish, number one, something was said that perhaps

6

shouldn't have been said; number two, that there's

7

prejudice*4 And I submit there has just not been a

8

showing of prejudice at this point*

9
10

man

utan.

I

But more

The Jury has not been shown to have
already decided this case*

11

THE COURT:

Thank you, Ms. Barlow.

12

It is your motion, Mr. Tenney.

I will

13

give you a brief opportunity to respond, if you wish

14

to, sir*

15

MR. TENNEY:

Thank you, your Honor.

16

am not arguing prosecutorial misconduct.

17

prejudice.

18

was made that the people were taken for a lot of

19

money.

20

that

21
22

I am arguing

In the opening statements, the statement

And the standard that I've cited, simply says

—
THE COURT:

Well, can I ask you a

question, Mr* Tenney?

23

THE TENNEY:

24

THE COURT:

25

I

Sure.
You threw me a curve here,

and I want to make sure I understood what you said*
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1

MR. TENNEY:

2

THE C O U R T :
300 and

Okay.
Now, is it the

3

that

4

statement

5

lot of money that you are objecting

6

both?

some people were defrauded, or is it the

that some -- that people were

7

MR. TENNEY:

8

specifically

9

is -- that

statement

taken for a

to, or is it

It is both.

But

it is

the statement of 333 stockholders,

is considered

10

that goes with

11

money.

12

specifically

in the light of the

which

statement

it that they were taken for a lot of

My objection

is to both

statements, but

as to the 333 s t o c k h o l d e r s .

13

And

the standard

is simply

is a

is right,

this

14

reasonable possibility.

15

is, in fact, a very attentive

16

all of the members of the jury could

17

statement.

There's no possible way that they

18

have missed

it.

19

their minds and

20

case.

21

That's why I'm

And

And M s . Barlow

if there

I do believe

their

feelings

There's certainly

22

arguing

I don't see how
have missed

it has

in regard

that reasonable

that

could

inflamed
to this
possibility.

prejudice.

MS. BARLOW:
figure?

jury.

23

to the dollar

24

the first time, I didn't

25

THE C O U R T :

Your Honor, may I respond

Since he didn't mention
respond
Go
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J.

tninK nis own Exhibits,

2

12 and 13 —

and in those exhibits dealing with

3

Cellwest and Cellwest Communications, he -- in Item

4

in each one of these exhibits —

5

exhibit for Cellwest -- I'm sorry.

6

number.

7

the number*of shares outstanding are seven point six

8

million shares.

9

Communcations, the number outstanding

well, in the first
I don't have the

It is either 12 or 13 -- he indicates that

In the other exhibit, for Cellwest
is eight point

10

five million shares.

11

what most people bought, we are talking 15 million

12

dollars.

13

out there is something that the Jury has not had som

14

evidence might be there.

15

At a dollar a share, which is

So I don't think that the figure she threw

That's all I have.

MR. TENNEY:

Your Honor, may I just

—

16

the number of shares, your Honor, has nothing to do

17

with the dollar value.

18

could own that number of shares.

19

no relationship to the value of the money raised at

20

all.

21

THE COURT:

One or two or three people
That has virtually

We'll recess just long

22

enough to give me the opportunity to the read the

23

case, and then I'm going to rule on the motion.

24
25

(Recess)
THE COURT:

The record may reflect tha
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1

all parties are present*

2

this time.

3

The Jury is not present at

Mr* Tenney, Miss Barlow, Ms. Nicholas, I

4

have had an opportunity to the read the cases

5

submitted to me in support of Mr. Tenney's motion for

6

a mistrial.

7

That motion is going to be denied at

8

this time for the following reasons:

First of all --

9

and the record ought to reflect that the Court is

10

relying on the case of State v. Troy, cited at 688

11

P.2d

12

State.

483, a 1984 Utah case, as the authority in this

13

On this particular

issue, that case sets

14

forth a two-prong test:

The first step or test is

15

whether or not the remarks made by the prosecutor

16

clearly called to the attention of the jury matters

17

outside of the evidence.

18

When making reference to the Defendant

19

in this particular case, the Court is of the opinion

20

that that prong has not been met for the following

21

reasons:

22

the Court did not allow into evidence State's Proposed

23

Exhibits 88 and 89, which I believe are alleged to be

24

Stockholders Lists, the statements made by the

25

Prosecutor in this particular case, in this Court's

Despite the fact that at this stage, anyway,
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upiuiyiif

was> uiaae on r e a s u n a u x e

2

evidence

regarding

3

evidence.

4

those

lists

tenance

would come

tnac

tne

into

And hindsight is always 20/20,

5

obviously.

6

was not received, the Court is not of the opinion that

7

the Prosecutor was attempting to call to the attention

8

of the Jury matters that were clearly outside of the

9

evidence.

10

And despite the fact that that evidence

In the Troy Case, for example, is a

11

situation where the Prosecutor

12

reference to the defendant's aliases, asked the jury

13

to compare the defendant to a Mr. Hinckly, matters so

14

far outside the evidence in that particular case --

15

the Court is satisfied that that threshold has simply

16

not been met in this particular case.

17

intentionally made

This is a case about —

at least from

18

the State's perspective -- and keeping in mind I have

19

only heard the State's case, at this point, but

20

certainly the Court is satisfied that at this stage of

21

the proceedings there is sufficiently

22

evidence to support the State's allegations in this

23

particular case, that the likelihood that the

24

statements made by the Prosecutor, that they were

25

prejudicial, is highly unlikely.
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1

The second prong of the Troy analysis

2

deals with the issue of prejudice.

3

says that when the evidence is thin and it's more

4

likely that the jury is going to be swayed by improper

5

remarks, then the threshold of prejudice is a little

6

easier met.

7

And Troy basically

On the other hand, where the evidence is

8

sufficiently compelling -- and this Court is of the

9

opinion that the evidence is sufficiently

compelling.

10

Thi e Court is not convinced that the statements will

11

have any prejudicial effect, considering the other

12

compelling evidence that has been received

13

with the elements of the counts charged

14

information.

15

consistent

in the

Also taking into consideration that the

16

Court did give an admonition to the Jury instructing

17

them, the fact that the opening statements made by the

18

parties were, in fact, not evidence and should not be

19

construed as evidence by the Jury.

20
21

For those reasons, Mr. Tenney, your
motion for a mistrial is denied.

22
23
24
25

Mr. Tenney, are you ready to call your
first witness?
MR. TENNEY:

I have one other motion to

make, your Honor.
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APPENDIX III

Ruling Excluding Cellwest Investor List
(R. 1434-40)

1

MR. TENNEY:

Your Honor, it may or may not be

2

premature to making motion.

3

but the State intends to introduce or have Debra Browning

4

give evidence regarding a stockholders' list from

5

Cellwest.

6

will make this in the form of a motion if you instruct.

7

I don't know the procedures, ajs I said.

8
9

I don't know the procedure,

I have two or three problems with that and I

The problem, No. 1, that I have with this is
that the prejudicial effect of introducing a

10

stockholders' list of Cellwest far outweighs the

11

probative values.

12

because it implies, depending on which list we use, that

13

all of these people might also have been victims and that

14

they didn't get their dollars back as some of the

15

witnesses have testified.

16

people on this stockholders' list.

17

point, is that it is simply not relevant for at least

18

three reasons.

19

stockholders' list is not related to the charges in this

20

case.

21

people in connection with this case who I am charged with

22

having violated securities laws, both fraud and selling

23

unregistered securities.

24

present that can authenticate these documents.

25

put on my case yet, but one of my major issues for which

It is very inflammatory.

Simply

There is no evidence in on the
That is my second

First of all, the information on the

There has been adequate testimony, No. 1, from the

And No. 3, there is no one
I haven't

145
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I will be calling government witnesses, is to show that
we have had some problems with our stockholders' list and
as a result, we have at least three or four versions of
the list.

There is not a certified list.
Nearly a year ago, Ms. Nicholas asked me to

stipulate to this and I said no.

And she said how she

could get a copy of a certified list, and I instructed
her that she needed to contact Mr. Bruce Rogers, Transinternational stock transfer, our last stock transfer
agent, to get a certified list from him.

And it seems to

me that we should have at least had a Motion in Limine or
some kind of a hearing and not be caught at this stage of
the proceedings with trying to introduce evidence, which
I have clearly opposed for well over one year.

And I

think it is very, very important that this not be —

that

we look at this because I think it is extremely
inflammatory.
THE COURT:

So you are making specific

reference to State's Proposed Exhibit 88; is that
correct?
MR. TENNEY:

I believe it is No. 88, Your

MS. BARLOW:

Yes, it is.

MR. TENNEY:

It is No. 88.

Honor.

I have in my hand

here at least seven stockholders' lists, with four
146
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different stock transfer agents.

None of them certified.

I don't believe that Debra Browning, she is not a stock
transfer agent.

She was simply a secretary at Cellwest.

That is the basis of my objection.

I would make that if

you prefer in the form of a motion or however you would
like me to do it.
THE COURT:
MS. BARLOW:

Thank you, Mr. Tenney.
Your Honor, as far as the issue of

prejudicial outweighs the probative, Mr. Tenney has
indicated it implies that these victims, quote, unquote,
did not get their money back.

We are not presenting it

to show that anyone got their money back.

In fact,

getting their money back has nothing to do with
securities fraud.

Some people did get their money back.

That doesn't make it not securities fraud.

It is the

misrepresentations and the failure to present relevant
facts that makes it securities fraud.

It has nothing to

do with whether anybody got their money back or not.

We

are not trying to claim that these investigators did or
did not get their money back.
As far as relevant, it shows that there was a
scheme and we indicate that it is to defraud.

We have

over 300 investors listed on this list and well over 4
million shares, and I think that goes to whether there
was a scheme or an artifice occurring here.
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1

As far as authentication, this list does not

2

need to be certified.

3*

that she had a list, if not this very one, then a similar

4

list that she kept in her desk, that she would be told to

5

add names to or delete names from as information came in.

6

She will testify how this list came into being.

7

What Ms. Lyman would testify to is

As far as Bruce Rogers and Trans-national, Ms.

8

Nicholas did check on these people.

9 J

either that business or that person.

She can't find
But the underlying

10

issue is whether there has to be some kind of a certified

11

list from a transfer agent, and I submit that that is not

12

what we are submitting this for.

13

as a person who was in the office and using a list

14

similar to this.

15

same.

16

on a daily basis under Mr. Tenney's direction.

Ms. Lyman can testify

She can testify that the names are the

That the list is similar to the ones she was using

17

MR. TENNEY:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. TENNEY:

Your Honor, may I respond to that?
Just very briefly.
Just very briefly.

The problem

20

is, if the State wants to use this to show that there was

21

a scheme to defraud, then we have to have some foundation

22

for admitting any of the lists. The lists that I have,

23

all but one —

24

on there that are not signed.

25

whatsoever as to where they came from.

two of the lists have stock transfer names
We have no authentication
The only
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1

stockholders' list that is authenticated is one in

2

connection with one of these companies and it is —

3

has a notary public and it was part of a merger

4

agreement.

That is the only stockholders" list that I

5

have here.

I have seven lists.

6

problem and I believe it is going to hurt me much more

7

than it will help me, and I do not believe that there is

8

any foundation for bringing in a stockholders' list that

9

is not certified.

10

THE COURT:

it

I think we have a major

I am going to rule as follows, Ms.

11

Barlow and Mr. Tenney.

12

sustain Mr. Tenney*s objection and preclude the State

13

from introducing proposed exhibit No. 88. We will state

14

that as part of the record.

15

going to preclude the State from introducing that exhibit

16

and the testimony of Ms. Lyman —

17
18

MS. BARLOW:

At this point I am going to

The reason why the Court is

Is that in reference to the

exhibit?

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. BARLOW:

21

THE COURT:

She has other purposes?
Yes.
As it relates to exhibit 88, the

22

Court is of the opinion that the probative value of this

23

document is outweighed by its prejudicial effect for the

24

reason that it does contain what appears to be over 300

25

names of other individuals alleged to have invested in
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1

Cellwest.

2

alleged data, purchase of chares. The Court is of the

3

opinion that taking into consideration the number that

4

appears on that list, also the total amount of dollars,

5

looks like in the millions of dollars, that the jury in

6

this case, there is a high likelihood that they may use

7

this particular list and construe that these individuals

8

on this list were also the victims of fraud.

9

It includes, looks like it includes data,

There is also some danger obviously that when

10

we first began this case and explained to the members of

11

the jury those individuals who were the subject of the

12

various counts of the Information, we identified those

13

individuals and if I recall the Jurors' responses, they

14

were not familiar with, nor did they have any

15

relationship whatsoever with the individuals who are the

16

subject of the counts contained in the Information.

17

There, of course, the danger that the list is so long

18

that there may be a relationship with the jurors and

19

those individuals listed on the stockholders' list. And

20

this Court is of the opinion that while the evidence may,

21

in fact, be relevant, Ms. Barlow, that the prejudicial

22

effect of this evidence far outweighs its probative

23

value.

24
25

So as to proposed exhibit 88, the Court is
going to preclude admission of that document, as well as
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1

Ms. Lyman's testimony regarding State's Exhibit 88.

2

Ms. Barlow, you indicated that the witness had

3

some other purposes for which the witness is expected to

4

testify.

5

MS. BARLOW:

Yes, Your Honor.

Ms. Nicholas

6 J

informs me that there is case law that allows in these

7

kinds of cases entry of a similar document.

8

our attempt to introduce this at a later time if we

9

present to the Court with case law that would support its

10

May we renew

admission?

11

THE COURT:

Let's put it this way, I am going

12

to read any authority you submit to me; but identify for

13

me the purposes that the witness is going to testify to

14

other than State's Exhibit 88.

15

MS. BARLOW:

She was a secretary and we are

16

going to ask her about her familiarity with Rick Jensen,

17

Steve Bowers, Ron Jeppson, Glen Kimball, names that have

18

been given here and what association, if any, they had

19

with Cellwest and also she was familiar with Mr. Tenney's

20

signature that appears on some of these documents.

21

MR. TENNEY:

22

was already —

23

we'll stay out of it.

24

to say.

25

I do have a problem with that. I

Where my signature is involved either —

THE COURT:

I dust don't know what I am trying

In that case, let's get the jury
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APPENDIX IV

"Juror Misconduct"-based New Trial Motion
Stipulation to Submit Motion on Affidavits
Ruling Denying Motion
(R. 807-12)

PATRICK L. ANDERSON, (#4787)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

*- v> ^ n :
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STIPULATION TO SUBMIT FOR
DECISION

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 921901056FS
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

JOHN B. TENNEY,
Defendant.

STIPULATION
On July 26, 1993 John B. Tenney, Pro Se, filed a Motion for
a New Trial and supporting memorandum.

Also, on July 26, 1993 the

Salt Lake Legal Defender Association was appointed to represent Mr.
Tenney in any subsequent proceedings.

On August 4, 1993, the State

of Utah filed a response to Tenney's Motion for a New Trial.
The undersigned herein stipulate and waive a hearing on
Tenney's Motion for a New Trial and request that the Court decide
Tenney's Motion for a New Trial based upon the memorandum and
Affidavits filed in the above-referenced case.
DATED this ///A day of August, 1993.

vA*1

&• ^J<2-*Z^z^>=)

N B. TENNEY
fendant

77

CC807

DATED this

//

day of Augus

ITRICK ^. ANDERSON
Attorney for John B. Tenney

iCJr>(eO

&*£L
CHARLENE BARLOW
Attorney for State of Utah

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
Charlene Barlow, Attorney Generals Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84114, this

day of August, 1993.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF
VS
TENNEY, JOHN B

CASE NUMBER 921901056 FS
DATE 10/06/93
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STH

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS SUBMITTED TO THE
COURT FOR DECISION WITHOUT HEARING BASED UPON THE STIPULATION OF
THE PARTIES. THE COURT HAVING RECEIVED ALL MEMORANDA IN SUPPORT
OF AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL,
COMES NOW AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:
1. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS DENIED FOR
THE REASONS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION THEROF.
2. PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE ORDER.
CC: CHARLENE,BARLOW
PATRICK ANDERSON

MljW^

CG8C9

, - ..if;o£

NOV

3 1993

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212)
LYNN NICHOLAS (6008)
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1331

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

JOHN B. TENNEY,

:

ORDER
Case No. 921901056
Judge Tyrone Medley

Defendant.

:

This matter came before the Court on defendant's motion
for new trial.

The parties submitted memoranda in support of and

in opposition to the motion and stipulated that the matter should
be decided on the memoranda.
THE COURT, having been fully advised in the premises/
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Defendant's motion for a new trial is denied for the
following reasons:
1.

The juror, Dr. Richard Barnett, may have violated

rule 17(j), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by briefly

CC8J0

conversing with another doctor about defendant's business
practices; however, that action does not justify a mistrial.
2.

Dr. Barnett's actions did not indicate that he had

formed an opinion or bias against defendant; neither was there
any indication that the actions would impact on the juror's
deliberation in the case.
Defendant is hereby notified pursuant to rule 22, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, that he has thirty days from the
date this order is signed to take an appeal in this matter.
DATED this

1
3 day
, of. ^v**^.
^
Oclubei, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

MEDLEY
District Judge
AP?ROVEb AS TO FORM:

-2-

C8U

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this j\j

day of October, 1993, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be handdelivered to the following:
Patrick Anderson, Esq.
Richard G. Uday, Esq.
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
with a copy sent by U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, and addressed as
follows:
John B. Tenney, defendant pro se
Salt Lake County Jail
437 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^jaUb-, QUi/CM/
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APPENDIX V

Restitution Hearing
(R. 2365-84)

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6. 199-3
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

This is case No. 921901056. The

matter of State of Utah vs. John B. Tenney.

Counsel,

would you identify yourselves.
MS. BARLOW:

Charlene Barlow and Lynn Nicholas

on behalf of the state. Your Honor.
MR. UDAY:

And, Your Honor, on behalf of Mr.

Tenney, Rich Uday and Rob Heineman from our appellate
division.
THE COURT: Where are we on this matter, Mr.
Uday?
MR. UDAY:

Your Honor, I believe we are

prepared to stipulate to the majority of the restitution
that is owed in this issue.

The remaining issue comes

down to restitution owed one individual, Mr. Zieglowsky,
and I believe how we would prefer to proceed this morning
is have the state proffer what their evidence would be.
We would proffer what ours would be and we have a legal
issue to a disputed perhaps $19,000 and we would ask the
Court to resolve that legal issue based on stipulated
testimony rather than taking evidence.
THE COURT: Why don't we go ahead then and
place the issues on the record that are stipulated to
that don't call for a decision on my part.

n o Q n r;

1

MR. UDAY:

If you will, I am going to defer to

2

counsel to do that. Your Honor.

3

MS. BARLOW:

Your Honor, we have prepared a

4

Schedule of Restitution.

There were nine people who

5

testified as to checks that they handed over to Mr.

6

Tenney and did not receive any money in return.

7

are other people who testified that they had handed over

8

money but they got their monev* back, and we have not

9

included those, but I have a Schedule of Restitution I

There

10

will present to the Court.

This is the names, the

11

address and amounts owing to these nine people which

12

total up to $53,950.

13

that because those were cancelled checks that were

14

introduced into evidence of money that was paid over to

15

Mr. Tenney and never recovered.

16

THE COURT:

I believe there is no dispute as to

Mr. Uday, is it an accurate

17

statement that the victims listed on this Schedule of

18

Restitution, handed to me by Ms. Barlow, is the

19

stipulation that you and Mr. Tenney are agreeing should

20

encompass at least the substantial portion of the

21

restitution order which would total $53,950?

22

MR. UDAY:

23

THE COURT:

That is correct. Your Honor.
Let's move forward then and let me

24

ask Mr. Tenney.

Mr. Tenney, this is the stipulation you

25

are entering into as well, sir?

ir^TTF"

1

MR. TENNEY:

2

THE COURT:

3
4

Yes, it is. Your Honor.
Let's move forward with Mr.

Zieglowskv's case.
MS. BARLOW:

Your Honor, I have here a

5

Memorandum in Support of Restitution that has been

6

prepared by Lynn Nicholas, mv co-counsel for the state in

7

this matter, which will help perhaps in laving out Mr.

8

Zieglowsky"s situation.

9

As the Court may recall from trial, Mr.

10

Zieglowsky testified that he and Mr. Tenney entered into

11

an Exchange Agreement.

12

three parcels of land property that Mr. Zieglowsky had,

13

and he turned over these three tracts of land to Mr.

14

Tenney, minus the indebtedness, for purposes of obtaining

15

stock, and approximately 33,000 shares of stock. And

16

this is the issue that is before this Court todav and

17

we'll proffer what Mr. Zieglowsky's testimony would be

18

about what had happened to these three tracts of land,

19

and then make our argument about the amount that we feel

20

is still owing on these tracts of land.

21

There were three tracts of land,

The first tract of land was a piece of property

22 I

that in the Exchange Agreement signed by Mr. Tenney and

23

Mr. Zieglowsky in January of 1988, they agreed, and Mr.

24

Zieglowsky will testify, that that agreement is based

25

u p o n a p p r a i s a l s that w e r e done at t h e t i m e .

A l l o f the

A

o n r •?

figures we are talking about here as values of the land
were based on appraisals at the time.

And this agreement

is that tract one had the value of $75,000. At the time
there was $27,000 owing to another party on this tract of
land.

This piece of property, tract No. 1, has a long

and varied history and I will get into that a little bit
later.
The second tract of land, the agreement based
on appraisals, was the value of the property was $42,800,
with an amount owing to First Security Financial of
$29,400.
The third tract of land is a piece of property
that was given over to Mr. Tenney but then in a
subsequent agreement the property was given back, was
deeded back or however it was transferred back and there
was no loss at all on tract No. 3.

So really we are not

talking about tract No. 3 here.

It is a piece of land

that Mr. Zieglowsky handed over.

He obtained it back.

Handed the stock back in return for this third tract of
land.

So tract 3 is really not at issue.
The first tract of land, Mr. Zieglowsky will

testify and we have documents that are attached to the
memorandum that has been handed to you that will support
this, the Exchange Agreement is attached to the
memorandum.

In that Exchange Agreement Mr. Zieglowsky

C23CS

handed over this piece of property.

The agreement was

that Mr. Tenney would refinance this piece of property
which is valued at $75,000, would pay the Lautens, the
other people who held a mortgage on this piece of land,
would pay them $20,000 and give them 1400 shares of
Cellwest for the other 7,000 that was owing to them.

The

Lautens then agreed to accept -20,000 cash and $7,000
worth of Cellwest stock.
When Mr. Tenney went to refinance that land and
get that money, he asked for $48,000. That is what he
asked the bank for.

He was then going to pay $20,000 to

the Lautens and the other 28,000 would be used for
Cellwest, for his own personal use. We don't know.
There is an agreement that is also attached to the
memorandum that states that the agreement was dated as of
January 29, 1988. And in this agreement Mr. Tenney and
Mr. Zieglowsky agreed that Ogden First Federal, which is
the bank that Mr. Tenney was trying to get the money
from, would not give him money.

Would not refinance his

property because Tenney had filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy.
The bank did agree to refinance the property if Tenney
had a co-signer and Mr. Zieglowsky agreed to be a cosigner.

That would be his testimony.
It would also be his testimony that although he
*

agreed to be the co-signer, he ended up being the only

02309

person who signed the note.

Mr. Tenney never did sign

it, so it left Mr. Zieglowsky responsible for the note
which was approximately $48,000.
In this agreement it states that Tenney would
be the beneficiary of 100 percent of the proceeds from
the refinancing and agreed to make every payment due
under the refinancing.

Mr. Zieglowsky agreed to become

the co-signer only on the basis that Tenney accepted full
responsibility for all payments, since Zieglowsky would
not receive any cash consideration for co-signing.
Tenney agreed to give Zieglowsky certain shares of stock
in Cellwest and New Generation.
collect the rents.

Zieglowsky agreed to

There was a rental property.

believe it was a three-unit rental property.

I

Zieglowsky

agreed to collect the rents and make the payments for one
year and his testimony would be that that is what he did.
For one year after the signing of this agreement, he
collects the rents, he made the payments to the bank.
The agreement was that thereafter Tenney would assume the
responsibility to collect the rents and make the
payments.

I think those are the most significant

agreement terms that are in this agreement that was
January 29, 1988.
Mr. Zieglowsky will testify that he co-signed
the note, although it turned out that Mr. Tenney never

02370

signed it.

Subsequently, he ended up the only signature

on the note.

He collected the rents for one year and

paid the payments for one year, and Tenney was to assume
that responsibility.
at that point.

Mr. Zieglowsky walked awav from it

His testimony would be that he was then

informed subsequently, I am not sure of the date, that
the bank was going to foreclose on his property because
payments had not been made after Mr. Zieglowskv made the
last payments.

He said he went to the property, one of

the units was vacant.

He walked in and there found the

letter from the bank indicating that future payments,
rent payments, were to be made directly to the bank.
It is Mr. Zieglowsky's testimony that he
checked with people who were living there and found that
they were not making rental payments.
living there rent-free.

Were basically

The bank was not getting paid

and the bank informed Mr. Zieglowsky the property was in
foreclosure.

In order to redeem the property from

foreclosure, Mr. Zieglowsky paid the bank approximately
$6,000 and I believe this was in 1991.
to redeem it from foreclosure.

So he paid $6,000

A foreclosure caused by

the fact that Mr. Tenney did not assume the
responsibility he had agreed to assume.
He also then owed instead of $27,000 on the
property, at the time of the assumption Tie owed $46,691
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and some-odd cents.

So our contention on that first

piece of property is that Mr. Tenney as restitution owes
the $6,000 that Mr. Zieglowsky had to pay because of the
redeeming from foreclosure.

And also Mr. Tenney ought to

pay the balance or the difference between the 27,000 that
was originally owing and the $46,700 approximately that
was owing at the time he took over the property, which is
a total of $19,700.

$19,700.

I believe in our memorandum we put 19,600.

We

rounded down that $91, instead of rounding up that $91.
The Court can determine whether it is 600 or 700.
THE COURT:

Where in the memorandum is that

located, Ms. Barlow?
MS. BARLOW:
THE COURT:
MS. BARLOW:

It is page three, I believe.
Okay, go ahead.
So our argument is on tract No. 1,

Mr. Tenney owes Mr. Zieglowsky 25,000 and either 6 or
$700, depending on whether you round it up or round it
down.

That is based on, Ms. Nicholas has gone about it

one way and subtracting it and getting the equity and I
have arrived at the same figure from a different
direction.

The way I arrived at it is the $6,000 that

Mr. Zieglowsky had to pay to redeem the property and the
difference between the indebtedness at the time he handed
the property over, before the refinancing, and the

B
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indebtedness at the time he received the property back,
the difference being the $19,600. You add those together
it is 25,600, and that is the state's argument on the
first property.
The second piece of property, tract No. 2, at
the time it was handed over, the value of the property
was $42,800. There was a balance owing to First Security
Financial of 29,400. That meant there was an equity of
about $13,400 in Mr. Zieglowsky's behalf.
was lost.

That property

Mr. Zieglowsky did not know it went into

foreclosure.

We have a Quitclaim Deed in which the

property was turned over, a copy of the Quitclaim Deed
that turned the property over to Mr. Tennev.

Mr.

Zieglowsky had nothing further to do with that property
after he turned it over.
The bank was not paid.
the property was lost.
it in time.
foreclosure.

The bank foreclosed and

Mr. Zieglowsky did not know about

He was not given any notice of the
He was not able to redeem the property.

I think that the state can make an argument
that there is one of two ways of looking at what Mr.
Zieglowsky lost there. He either lost, at the very
least, he lost $13,400 because that is his equity at the
time he turned the property over. The property was gone
and he never received his equity.

He received Cellwest
9
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stock which was and is worthless.
The other argument that I think could be made,
although this calls for speculation to a certain extent,
is that had he not turned that property over to Mr.
Tenney, had it not been foreclosed, he would have the
opportunity of making the payments on this and eventually
owning the full amount of the property.

So that the

argument could be made, although I agree that this is a
tenuous argument, that the full 42,800 is what he lost:
but that is asking for speculation that he would have
made the payments and that eventually he would have owned
it free and clear and sold it for that amount.

The very

least, Mr. Tenney owes Mr. Zieglowsky $13,400 for the
second tract of property.
Based on that proffer of evidence, which is
mixed in, I recognize with my arguments on the values,
the state feels that the restitution owing to Mr.
Zieglowsky from Mr. Tenney is $25,600 for the first tract
of property; 13,400 for the second tract of property,
making a total of 39,000 that is owing to Mr. Zieglowsky.
And that added to the amount owing to the other
individuals, that is over $92,000. That is the amount of
restitution that we would ask the Court assess in this
matter.

That is not taking into account the payments

that Mr. Zieglowsky had to make on the property that he
10
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was able to redeem since 1991. We have not figured that
in at all.
Unless the Court has any further question,
that's it.
THE COURT:
Uday finishes.

I may have a question after Mr.

Thank you, Ms. Barlow.

MR. UDAY:

Thank you. Your Honor.

Basically,

our proffer to the Court will be that if Mr. Tenney were
to take the stand and testify today, that he would
clarify for the Court that both of these tracts of
properties we are talking about, tract 1 and 2, are in
fact rental properties.

I believe both are tri-plexes.

Mr. Tenney would indicate that he, in fact, received from
Mr. Zieglowsky $20,000 from a loan that Mr. Zieglowsky
originated with the bank for the purpose of paying off
the original creditor, I believe, in tract 1. That
$20,000 is restitution he owes, in fact, to Mr.
Zieglowsky.
He would further testify that he did not
receive, to his knowledge at any time, any title to
either of those two properties.

He certainly did not

receive the keys to the apartments or any rental
information from Mr. Zieglowsky and neither did he
receive any Notice of Foreclosure from the bank in either
case.

He never collected a rent payment, he never had a
11
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1

key to the apartment.

And, in fact, when Mr. Zieglowsky

2

walked away from the apartment, as counsel indicated, he

3

was not given notice that he was to then assume those

4

responsibilities, nor did he receive the wherewithal to

5

assume those responsibilities.

6

He would further indicate for purposes of a

7

payment schedule for restitution that he is presently

8

employed at Advantage Mortgage making a gross amount of

9

$1500 a month.

That turns out to be a net of $1350 a

10

month.

11

a $200 a month restitution payment is owed, leaving for

12

Mr. Tenney and the family of five, $1150 a month income.

13
14

The probation department and he have figured out

The only assets that he has are an '86 Cadillac
that they are sharing between the four licensed drivers.

15

MR. TENNEY:

16

MR. UDAY:

That is correct.

And the second car, that is not

17

working.

18

transmission work.

19

if he were to testify today.

20 I
21

Presently needs about $650 worth of
That would be Mr. Tenney's testimony

If the Court would like, I could indicate our
dispute with the 19,000 to Mr. Zieglowsky.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. UDAY:

Go ahead, sir.
Thank you. Your Honor.

Basically,

24

the other $19,000 that has been talked about by counsel

25

today, we would argue is not appropriate restitution.

In
12

V*» 0 4

essence, our position would be, Judge, that that amount
of money would fall into the province of civil
litigation, if anything at all, and that Mr. Zieglowsky
should not have the benefit of the Attorney General's
Office to pursue this claim on his behalf.
The support we would have for that argument.
Your Honor, flows from a fairly recent case called "State
vs. Burton," from the Utah Appellate Court, if I may
approach.

I have handed counsel this case as well.
In this case briefly, Judge, what occurred was

a real estate transaction, not unlike the one that
occurred here.

In essence, an individual who could not

obtain a loan to purchase a property bought the property
on a Contract of Sale. Where he agreed to pay "A," "A"
agreed to pay "B," and "BM would in theory pay the
mortgage company.

What happened is "A" paid "B."

Everything was fine for a while.

M

B" then did not at one

point continue in his payment to the mortgage company.
The mortgage company foreclosed on who was "A" living in
the home or having possession of the home.

"A" then

sought the services of the County Attorney's Office who
prosecuted a theft case against M B f " and the Court at
page 819 of that opinion indicated that they are slow to
give approval to the broad construction of theft that was
urged by the state in that particular case.

Basically
13
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holding that that, in fact, is a civil matter; that the
contractor that was involved in that situation between
those parties had obligations that were civil in nature.
If someone defaulted in that obligation, that the claim
should have been pursued civilly as a civil remedy,
rather than a criminal.

Clarifying the subsequent case,

that it is not a question of whether there is another
remedy, civil versus criminal,* you can't have both in a
particular case.

But that this type of contract dispute

over real estate property is a civil matter and did not
include criminal considerations.
I think closely related to this Burton case is
the case I recall from, I believe it is the Court of
Appeals as well. State vs. Robinson, which was an
individual in Circuit Court, pled guilty to a traffic
offense, maybe two traffic offenses and relating to an
automobile accident.

One was maybe a speeding or failure

to make the lane change properly, or something, and no
driver's license.

As part of the guilty plea in that

case, the Judge ordered 13,000-some-odd dollars
restitution for the injuries that were suffered by the
car who was hit by virtue of the traffic violation.

The

Court, after answering some other issues that were
presented before it, indicated that due process did not
allow the Court to order restitution in that collateral
14
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kind of a question primarily because it did not give the
offender in that situation a forum in which he could
dispute perhaps the causation factor or a combination of
co-negligence.
it.

Comparative negligence is what we call

I'm not working in that area of the law, and because

of that due process, prohibited the Court from ordering
that amount of restitution.
I would say that the combination of those two
cases in this incident ought to clarify for us that Mr.
Tenney is not responsible for the $19,000. He did not
have any title or any physical possession of that
property in any way.

He never collected rents, but

perhaps when Mr. Zieglowsky walked away, that that is
really what happened.

He walked awav and rents were not

collected by anyone as the state suggested.

If that is

the case, there may be a comparative negligence kind of a
claim that Mr. Tenney could raise at some point, which
would then violate due process in this Court for the
Court to impose that additional amount of restitution
here.
Additionally, because there is a contract that
was signed by these parties and because these are
collateral issues to the sale of securities which he was
found guilty for by the jury, I believe that these are
collateral questions and the Court should not impose that
1fi
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additional $19,000 worth of restitution, and order 20,000
to Mr. Zieglowsky.

Thank you. Your Honor.

THE COURT:
Uday.

I have a question for you, Mr.

First of all, do you have a cite for the Robinson

case?
MR. UDAY:
approach.

I do.

It is 860 P2d 979.

If I may

Co-counsel is provided that a copy of that as

well. Your Honor.
THE COURT:

The other issue I want to raise

with you, Mr. Uday, and I will give Ms. Barlow a chance
to respond to that, the jury in this case found Mr.
Tenney guilty of what amounts to a fraud case for the
most part.

I mean, I recognize the other differences,

but my concern is this, and I recognize this matter is on
appeal.
The restitution statute allows the Court under
appropriate circumstances to award restitution up to, I
think, double the amount.

That is probably not a

verbatim quote, but I am wondering if you are aware of
any cases in the State of Utah that may have cited the
provision in the restitution statute allowing a trial
court to award up to double the amount of restitution?
And if you are aware of such a statute, do you know what
criteria ought to be met before a Court imposes up to
double the amount?
16
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1

My concerns are the broad aspects of this

2

particular case and it may in fact be that if double the

3

amount is appropriate, it may in fact be appropriate

4

under facts and circumstances where fraud is established,

5

so to speak.

6

MR. UDAY:

Your Honor, I am not aware of a case

7

that further defines or broadens the statute itself.

8

However, in 77-18-1, I believe it is Subsection 3, there

9

is a Subsection 3-B. I believe the qualifying paragraph

10

indicates what the Court is to consider in imposing

11

double, if you desire to do that.

12

restitution at all, the Court may consider factors. That

13

is why we indicated what Mr. Tenney*s testimony would be

14

regarding the nature of his ability to pay.

15

paints a picture there is precious little ability to pay

16

based on his current situation.

17

THE COURT:

In fact, in imposing

I think that

This is the thing that frustrates

18

me to no end and not ,1ust with Mr. Tenney.

This is not

19

particularly to Mr. Tenney, but what frustrates me to no

20

end with criminal defendants who end up convicted and

21

then they get employed, I recognize Mr. Tenney has a

22

family to support, and those are the factors which I am

23

obligated to take into consideration.

24

but we have victims out there who are out large sums of

25 J

money, but yet everybody, it seems every defendant, wants

I
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to pay it back in very small sums.
Let me ask you a question about one point.

How

many hours a week does Mr. Tenney work?
MR. UDAY:

My understanding, he works full

time.
THE COURT:

Is that 40 hours a week?

MR. TENNEY:
THE COURT:

That is correct. Your Honor.
Now, tell me why Mr. Tenney should

not be held to a standard of working more than 40 hours a
week t1ust for a limited duration for the sole purpose of
paying restitution in this case so it won't take a
lifetime to get these victims paid off?
MR. UDAY:

I think the Court's position is well

taken and, in fact, the Court should know that Mr. Tenney
does not disagree with that position.

But one of the

subsequent issues we want to present to the Court today
circles around his probation.
He is now on ISP, intensive supervised
provision, which requires a curfew.

He has desired to

have that changed, but wanted me to talk to the Court a
little bit later. His probation officer is present.
Part of his concern is that the curfew is doing two
things that limit his ability to make things right in
this case.

No. 1, it limits his ability to do some

community service hours the Court has imposed because he
18
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has to be home by 9:00, I believe it is. The other is,
it has prohibited him from getting a second part-time
job.
Now I have talked with his probation officer
today who is not prepared to recommend that he be removed
from ISP. He has some concerns and I think we can
address that later: but in short, the ISP probation
officer, he can correct me if I am wrong, has indicated a
willingness to allow both community service and a parttime job to be done by adjusting the curfew once Mr.
Tenney is able to show him verification of the community
service hours and location he intends to work and of the
part-time job he would intend to engage in.

Is that

correct?
VOICE:

That is correct.

THE COURT:

Let me make a suggestion so you

will know where I am headed on this point.
priority is going to be on restitution.

My No. 1

I am not

persuaded at all to release Mr. Tenney from the ISP
requirements for the purpose to complete community
service.

Community service, while important, don't get

me wrong, is a little bit lower down on the pecking order
compared to restitution.

So I am much more likely to go

along with relaxing of curfew requirements for the sole
purpose of maintaining second employment.
19
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Assuming Mr. Tenney has no health problems that
would interfere with a second job, I am trying to think
of things that could reasonably interfere with a second
job that this Court would find acceptable.
concerns is one point.

Other than that, I think I

mentioned this at the time of sentencing.
this is new.

Mavbe health

I don't think

Forty hours to me is not enough, to be

honest with you.

I dust don't see it that way.

Furthermore, Mr. Uday, and I recognise I am
changing gears here and I am going to ask Ms. Barlow the
same thing, I want you to take a look at —

I want you to

research the point to determine whether or not there are
cases in other jurisdictions, if none exist in the State
of Utah, that possibly have similar restitution statutes
that allow for imposing up to double the amount.
want that issue researched.

I do

So I am going to ask that

you locate some cases in that regard so I can have some
guidance on that point.
MR. UDAY: We would be happy to do that.
THE COURT: Again, I am going to consider that
under the circumstances of this case because of the
nature of this case, basically.

And if I were to so

find, I would commit those findings to writing and spell
it out.
MR. UDAY:

Perhaps while we are on the record,
20
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